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Abstract 
During the past two decades, the ontological status of the theoretical posits of folk 
psychology - intentional properties - has invited a great deal of debate. According to 
the doctrine called "eliminativism," intentional properties such as beliefs and desires 
are not real or genuine. One argument for eliminativism can be summarized as 
follows: (1) Intentional properties do not supervene on intrinsic physical properties of 
individuals. (2) However, individualism holds that the theoretical posits of scientific 
disciplines must be those determined by intrinsic physical properties of individuals. (3) 
The theoretical posits of the sciences exhaust all existents. Thus, (4) intentional 
properties do not exist. The central aim of this thesis is to examine premise 
individualism in detail. Some philosophers (e.g., Fodor) hold that individualism can 
be derived from certain metaphysical principles. In this thesis, however, I shall argue 
that individualism cannot be derived from a priori grounds, nor does it conform to 
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Chapter L Introduction: The Eliminativist's Argument from 
Individualism 
L Intentional States And Folk Psychology 
In daily life, we often ascribe other people mental states such as beliefs and desires to 
explain and predict their behaviour. Here is a typical example. Suppose that we saw 
Lorraine open the fridge and are interested in why she did so. To explain her action, 
we can rationalize or make sense of it in a way like this: She opened the fridge 
because she desired to have a glass of water and believed that opening the fridge 
would help her satisfy her desire. If, to modify the example, we instead know in 
advance what Lorraine wants and believes, we can predict that she will tend to open 
the fridge. 
States such as beliefs and desires (along with intentions, hopes, wants, and other 
attitudes) belong to a category of mental states often called "intentional states”) 
Generally, intentional states are conceived as involving an individual's attitude toward 
a proposition or truth condition (this is why they sometimes are called "prepositional 
attitudes"). The attitudes include such things as belief, desire, fear, hope, and so on. 
The proposition in question constitutes the state's content. In general, the form of 
1 Some authors distinguish the terms "intentional properties" and "intentional states", using the former 
to refer to instantiations of the latter at particular times. In what follows, when there is no threat of 
confusion, I shall use the two interchangeably. 
] 
statement that ascribes a prepositional attitude to an individual can be characterized as 
follows: "SW-s that p", where "S" refers to an individual, "W" names any verb 
expressing an attitude, and "that p" specifies any proposition or truth-condition. 
"Lorraine believes that her boyfriend is smart" and "Pei hopes that Lorraine believes 
that her boyfriend is smart" are two typical examples of such statements. 
It is generally believed that intentional states have the following characteristics. 
First, intentional states have contents or meanings, which are semantically evaluated 
with respect to the world - that is, they can be true or false. For example, my belief 
that the sun will rise tomorrow has the sun will rise tomorrow as its content, and is a 
true belief. Typically the content of an intentional state is specified by the that clause, 
in this case, "that the sun will rise tomorrow". 
Second, intentional states are individuated by their attitudes and contents. 
Hoping that today is a rainy day and believing that today is a rainy day, though having 
the same content - that today is a rainy day - count as two different intentional states, 
since they are different attitudes. The belief with the content that I wil! pass the exam 
and the one with the content that I�vil! not pass the exam are also regarded as two 
different intentional states, for though they are the same kind of attitude, they have 
different contents. 
2 See, e.g., Fodor (1987). ch. 1. 
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Third, intentional states are causally efficacious'^ with respect to behaviour and 
other mental states, and so are regarded as having genuine causal powers - that is, 
having effects on the physical world. We expect that changes in mental states will 
produce certain changes in behaviour and other mental states. To illustrate, consider 
again the above case. Intuitively, it is because Lorraine has intentional states with the 
contents they do that she exhibited a particular behaviour (and other mental states). 
Had she not possessed intentional states with those contents - that is, not possessed 
any (occmrent) intentional states at that time, or possessed mental states with other 
contents - she would not have behaved in that way. 
According to a view often called "Theory theory", we are capable of predicting and 
explaining people's behaviour in terms of intentional states because we apply an 
implicit empirical theory sometimes called "folk psychological theory (or just "folk 
p s y c h o l o g y , ， ) / In general terms, we may think of a theory as a set of principles or 
generalizations for explaining certain phenomena. Newtonian mechanics, for example, 
can be thought of as a cluster of principles devised to explain the motions of physical 
objects. That folk psychology is a theory, thus, implies that it comprises a collection 
3 For variety, in what follows I shall use "causally irrelevant (to behaviour and other mental states)," 
"causally inefficacious," "causally impotenl," "causally inert," and "causally redundant" 
interchangeably. 
4 In the current literature, "folk psychology" is just one name among many to name this implicit theory. 
Some prefer the name “commonsense psychology." Other labels include "belief-desire psychology," 
"naive psychology." However, since folk psychology is still the most commonly used label in the 
literature, in what follows I shall conform to this practice. 
o 
J 
of psychological generalizations aiming at explaining mental phenomena and 
behaviour. Where/o/A： psychology is concerned, these psychological generalizations 
are so platitudinous and intuitive that "everyone knows them, everyone knows that 
everyone else knows them, and so on” (Lewis (1972): p.256). Some such 
generalizations are as follows: 
a. When a normal person is looking at a traffic light, which changes from red to 
green, she usually comes to believe that it has changed from red to green. 
b. If a person believes that all scorpions are poisonous, and if she comes to believe 
that Henry's pet is a scorpion, then she will typically come to. believe that 
Hemry's pet is poisonous. 
c. If a person sitting at a bar wants to order a beer, and if she has no stronger desire 
to do something that is incompatible with ordering a beer, then typically she will 
order a beer.^ 
d. If a person desires to eat a cake and believes that opening the fridge can help her 
realize her desire, she will tend to open her fridge. 
On this view, we can successfully explain Lorraine's behaviour because the event 
to be explained, her opening the fridge, is subsumed under d. Note although that the 
5 a - c are from Stich and Ravenscroft ((1995); Stich (1996), p. 126) 
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psychological laws given above refer to particular contents of mental states (e.g., the 
desire to order a beer), they are not content-dependent.^ Rather they can all be 
regarded as instances of more general laws. For instance, (d) can be regarded as an 
instance of a general law we might call "the practically reasoning syllogism": 
(x)(D)(Q) (If X desires that D, and believes that by doing Q, x can succeed in realizing 
D, then, ceteris paribus, x will do Q). .., 
2. Eliminativism, External ism, and Individualism 
During the past two decades or so, the ontological status of theoretical posits of folk 
psychology - intentional states - has invited a great deal of debate. According to the 
doctrine called "eliminative materialism" (or just "eliminativism "), just as "witches 
and Homer's gods are just myths” (Stich (1995); (1996): p. 115), beliefs and desires do 
not e x i s t . 7 At least at first sight, no doctrine in philosophy of mind is as radical and 
shocking as eliminativism.^ In explaining and predicting behaviour by making use of 
intentional states, we seem to presuppose that some explanations of this kind are true, 
and some are false. But if eliminativism is right, it follows that none of these 
6 But one should note that not all laws of folk psychology are of this kind. Some psychological laws 
inevitably involve particular contents or types of contents. The law that the moon looks bigger near the 
horizon, and that people will act in order to avoid a perceived threat are two instances of 
content-dependent laws (see Botterill and Carruthers (1999)). 
7 One should note that not all authors use the term "eliminativism" to refer to this ontological claim 
about intentional states; some use it just for the view that folk psychology is a radically mistaken theory. 
For the relationship between these two readings of ‘‘eliminativism,” see (Stich (1996)). 
^ The following alleged implications of eliminativism are pointed out by Stich and Ravenscroft (1995). 
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explanations can be true, for there are simply no such things as intentional states. 
Moreover, many disciplines presuppose the existence of intentional states. For 
example, for a long time whether knowledge is justified true belief has been one of 
central problems in epistemology. But now again suppose that eliminativism turns out 
to be true, then all our attempts to answer this problem become worthless, since there 
is no such thing as a belief. When reflecting deeply on the implications of 
eliminativism, we may tend to agree with Jerry Fodor that the success of 
eliminativism would be "the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our 
species" (1987: xii). 
There are various routes to eliminativism. In this thesis I shall examine one often 
discussed argument for eliminativism: the argument from individualism.^ It goes 
roughly as follows: According to the doctrine often called external ism, intentional 
properties are widely individuated, which, means roughly that their identity conditions 
depend not just on intrinsic or narrow properties but also on certain relational or wide 
properties. Scientific psychology, the subject that aims to tell us the true story about 
mind, must abide by individualism, which holds roughly that the explanatory 
categories or kinds taxonomized or individuated by scientific psychology must be 
narrow. As a result, at least at first sight, intentional states as folk psychology 
9 See Stich (1996): pp.22-3, Botterill and Carruthers (1999): pp. 155-6. 
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conceives them cannot have any legitimate role in scientific psychology. This claim, 
accompanied by the controversial but common assumption that only entities and 
properties posited by the sciences are real or genuine，some philosophers argue, 
implies eliminativism. The argument can be stated more clearly as follows: 
The Eliminativist's argument from Individualism 
1. Folk psychology is an implicit theory that predicts and accounts for how the mind 
works, i.e., how certain mental states produce other mental states and how 
interactions between mental states produce behaviour. It consists of a set of 
generalizations couched in terms of intentional properties. . 
2. Intentional properties, the theoretical posits of folk psychology, do not supervene 
on intrinsic physical properties. 
3. The theoretical posits of scientific psychology, however, must be properties that 
supervene on intrinsic physical properties. 
4. Therefore, the intentional states of folk psychology cannot be proper candidates 
for theoretical posits of scientific psychology (from 1, 2, and 3). 
5. Science is the only tribunal of what things are real or what exists. 
6. Therefore, intentional states such as beliefs and desires do not exist. Or, 
equivalently, intentional properties are not real or genuine (from 4 and 5). 
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To be sure, all the premises of the above argument (1，2, 3, and 5) are controversial 
and the argument establishes the eliminati\dst's conclusion only if all its premises turn 
out to be true. In this thesis, I will not attempt to evaluate all the premises, but will 
focus mainly on premise 3. 
3, Overview of the thesis 
The next chapter is devoted mainly to explaining the meaning of premise 2, that 
intentional properties do not supervene on intrinsic physical properties. I will explain 
several notions, such as intrinsic and relational properties, which are essential to 
understanding extemalism properly. Extemalism can be derived in various ways. The 
most well-known of these is the Twin-Earth thought experiments presented by 
Putnam in his celebrated paper "The meaning of "meaning"" (1975). He argues that 
ascriptions of intentional states to an individual need to take account of the 
individual's environment. Though my major concern is not whether extemalism is 
true, in this chapter I shall examine one famous objection to it, since doing so may 
help clarify the nature of this doctrine. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are the core of the thesis. In chapter 3，Stich's often-discussed 
argument for individualism, what he calls "the replacement argument", will be 
examined in detail. Since it derives individualism mainly from a normative claim 
8 
concerning the explananda of psychology - that scientific or systematic psychology 
should concern itself only with explaining and predicting autonomous behaviour - I 
call it "the aim of psychology argument". In that chapter I shall argue that this 
normative doctrine does not do justice to actual practices of psychological inquiry. 
Since Stich provides us with no a priori grounds for it, I conclude that his argument 
fails. 
However, I think that an argument in Fodor's Psychosemantics (1987) concerning 
the nature of causation can be used to support this normative doctrine. This argument 
is a reductio one. It argues that taxonomizing the explananda of psychology 
non-autonomously (indeed the explananda of any science) needs to postulate a kind of 
causal mechanisms. Since Fodor thinks that such mechanisms are mad or impossible, 
the explananda of psychology must be taxonomized autonomously. However, I argue 
that Fodor's argument does not work, for he confuses causation with individuation. 
In chapter 4, I shall discuss Fodor's argument, which I call "explanan argument". 
His argument is so called by me because it argues for individualism not from a 
normative constraint on the individuation of psychological explananda but from a 
claim about how explanantia should be typed. Fodor argues that any taxonomy of 
explanatory kinds (explanantia) in the sciences must obey a constraint that he calls 
"global individualism", which holds that explanatory kinds devised by the sciences 
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must be individuated by their causal powers: If two things agree in causal powers, 
then they must be grouped under the same kind. Since psychology is generally 
regarded as a scientific discipline that provides causal explanations and predictions by 
constructing causal generalizations, it must as well obey global individualism. The 
causal powers of anything, according to Fodor, are determined by or supervenient on 
that thing's intrinsic physical properties. It follows that the causal powers of 
intentional states, the explanantia of scientific psychology, must supervene on 
intrinsic physical properties. 
Though Fodor thinks that explanatory kinds in psychology must be individualistic, 
as a friend of folk psychology, he tries to remove the conflict between premise 2 and 3 
by working out a notion of content {narrow content) from content employed in folk 
psychology. I argue that Fodor's attempt is unsuccessful. 
Fodor thinks that global individualism is supported not only by actual practices 
of individuation in scientific disciplines but also by an uncontroversial view about 
causation. I argue that, to the contrary, global individualism cannot do justice to actual 
scientific practices. Nor can it be derived from metaphysical grounds. As a result, it 
fails to place a plausible constraint on taxonomy of explanantia. Worse，I argue that 
Fodor's explanan argument cannot be sound, since it either contains false premises or 
equivocates on the notion of causal powers. 
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Chapter 2: Mental States and Externalism 
This chapter is devoted to explaining the meaning of externalism. In section 1,1 shall 
explain the distinction between intrinsic and relational properties. Understanding it is 
essential to properly understanding externalism. Since the notion of supervenience 
can help characterize the idea of the intrinsic and the relational, in section 2, a brief 
account of supervenience will be provided. In sections 3 to 5，I will present the 
standard argument for externalism 一 the Twin-Earth thought experiment and explain 
how externalism with regard to intentional states can be derived from semantic 
externalism. In section 6, one alleged threat of physicalism will be discussed. In 
section 7, I shall discuss one common objection to externalism, which arises from 
misunderstanding the nature of externalism. 
7. The Distinction between Intrinsic and Relational Properties 
Some properties are intrinsic.��Crudely, a property counts as an intrinsic one just in 
case the possession of it by an object is wholly determined by the object itself. 
Paradigmatic narrow properties include such things as physiological, chemical，and 
A terminological note: in the current literature various names are used to denote the intrinsic and 
relational properties characterized here (e.g., narrow - wide; autonomous - non-autonomous; internal -
external (for variety, sometimes I will also use these terms)). Moreover, philosophers usually use the 
term "intrinsic physical properties" to denote a kind of intrinsic property - those posited by 
fundamental physics (e.g. Wilson (1995)) and call any properties that supervene on this kind of 
property "autonomous properties" (e.g. Stich (1978), (]983)). 
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microstructural constitutions. The particular molecular structure of my ring, for 
instance, is an example of an intrinsic property, for whether or not an object possesses 
this property is a matter of how it is, wholly independently of things external to 
Similarly, my book shelves possess the property of being composed of a certain 
chemical composition, which is intrinsic to the shelves and involves nothing external 
to them. 
I shall call properties that are not intrinsic "relatiojial ". As a first approximation, a 
property can be said to be relational just in case the possession of it is determined not 
only by the object itself but also by things external to it. As a result, it is possible that 
there are two objects indiscernible with respect to their intrinsic features,-yet only one 
of them possesses a certain relational property. The properties of being located ten 
kilometers from Fung King Hey building, being embedded in a world in which there 
is H 2 0 in rivers, and living in a speech community in which the speakers use 
"arthritis" to refer to the inflammation of ankle, are typical examples of relational 
properties, since whether or not an object possesses them depends on the natural and 
social environment, it is in. 
Some properties are relational because an object's possessing them partly depends 
on historical factors. One obvious example is being a dime. An object can be a dime 
” I n saying this I am not denying that my ring can causally interact with the external world and hence 
its molecular structure can change over time. 
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only if it possesses certain historical properties, namely being certified by the 
government. Anything that doesn't possess such properties is not a dime, but at most a 
fake. Another example is being a mosquito bite. A mark on the skin created by 
microsurgery is not a mosquito bite, even if it is intrinsically indiscernible from a real 
one. 
Some relational properties have their own narrow counterpart or correlate. That 
is, they are hybrid relational properties in the sense that they can be decomposed into 
two components, one an intrinsic property, the other a relational one. One obvious 
example of such properties is weight. Weighing two newtons is a relational property. 
Yet corresponding to this property, there is an intrinsic property, having a mass of a 
certain number of kilograms, which is correlated with the relational property of being 
subject to a gravitational field with certain values, in such a way that these properties 
jointly constitute the property of weighing two newtons. Another uncontroversial 
example of a hybrid relational property is being a planet. Something is a planet in 
virtue of facts about its possession of a certain physical constitution (the internal or 
intrinsic component of being a planet) and facts about its orbiting a particular star (the 
external or relational component of being a planet). Anything that does not possess 
both of these components cannot be a planet. By contrast, to possess a pure relational 
property, such as living in a watery world, an object need not possess any particular 
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physical composition. Whether an object possesses a pure relational property depends 
wholly on whether it possesses certain environmental factors. 
The above characterizations of narrow and wide properties are somewhat rough. 
To make them more precise, we can make use of the notion of supervenience. Let me 
provide a brief account of supervenience. 
2. Supervenience 
Supervenience is intended to capture the idea that one set of properties is wholly 
determined by or dependent on another.】：The idea of supervenience can be 
formulated in various ways. One common formulation is by means of the notion of 
indiscernibilily. To illustrate, let S and B be two sets of properties (call them 
"supervenient properties，，and "base properties", respectively). Then S weakly 
supervenes on B just in case: 
It is necessary that for any two objects a, and b, if they are indiscernible with 
respect to properties in B, then they will be indiscernible with respect to all 
properties in S. 
12 Other than capturing the notion of dependency or determination, supervenience is usually expected 
to explicate the notion of covariance and to do justice to the nonreducihiliy of the supervenient 
properties to their base properties. Whether or not supervenience can do all of these jobs is still a 
controversial question. For a more detailed discussion of supervenience see Kim (1990). 
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The notion of "necessity” is usually elucidated by the language of possible worlds.]? 
Crudely, to say that a statement is necessarily true is to say that it is true in all possible 
worlds. The above formulation thus is just to say that whatever possible world that we 
pick out, if we find that a and b instantiate all properties in set B, we will also find 
that they will not differ in any property in the set S. 
Weight, for example, supervenes on mass and local gravity. For in all possible 
worlds, no pair of objects having the same mass and subject to the same local gravity 
have different weights. By contrast, weight does not supervene on size, since in some 
possible worlds, some objects have the same size but differ in weight. • 
It is generally agreed that supervenience can also be formulated by employing 
nomological relations. With certain mereological assumptions, the following 
formulation is generally regarded as logically equivalent to the one in terms of the 
notion of indiscemibility]* 
S weakly supervenes on B just in case it is necessary that for any property F in S, if 
an object a has F, then there is a property G in B such that a has G and if any other 
13 Since the nature of possible worlds can be specified in a variety of ways {logical couceplual, or 
uomoJogical possible world), forms of supervenience vary depending on what notion of possible 
worlds we choose. 
M See, e.g., Kim (1996), (1998), 
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object has G，it has F. 
As I said above, weight supervenes on mass and local gravity. So for any possible 
world we select, if an object a has the weight of 10 newtons, then it has a certain mass 
and is subject to local gravity with a certain value such that if any other object in the 
same possible world instantiates those properties, it weighs 10 newtons as well. 
One should note that weak supervenience is not valid across possible worlds, but 
just relative to a particular one. As a result, it permits two objects in different 
possible worlds to differ in their supervenient properties even if they share all the 
same base properties. Or, to put it differently, it is compatible' with weak 
supervenience that a given property in S, F, has a property G as its supervenient base 
in a possible world vd, and yet there is an another possible world, w2, in which an 
object, though instantiating G, does not possess F. For example, that weight only 
weakly supervenes on mass and local gravity is compatible with the claim that two 
objects in two different possible worlds, which have the same mass and are subject to 
the same local gravity, differ in their weight (the object in wl weighs x, but the one in 
w2 weighs y), or that a given weight x has a certain set {mass x*，local gravity z} as 
its supervenient base in vrl, but some object in w2 does not weigh x even though it 
instantiates the same mass-gravity set. 
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We can construct a stronger version of supervenience if the validity of 
supervenience holds relative not to a particular possible world, but across all possible 
worlds. Supervenience so construed is called "strong supervenience." For this notion, 
the indiscemibility formulation is as follows: 
S strongly supervenes on B just in case for any world wl and w2, and for any 
objects a and b, if a in wl and b in m>2 are indiscernible with respect to all B 
properties, then a in m>1 and b in w2 are indiscernible with respect to all S 
properties. 
And we obtain the nomological relation formulation of strong supervenience by 
adding a second "necessarily" to the weak one: 
S strongly supei-venes on B iff it is necessary that for any property F in S，if an 
object a has F, then there is a property G in B such that a has G and necessarily if 
any other object has G, it has F. 
So much for the notion of supervenience. With the help of this notion, the notion of 
a property being determined by the others can be made more precise and thus the 
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notion of narrow and wide properties can be made more precise, as follows. A 
property P is said to be narrow iff it supervenes on intrinsic physical properties. By 
contrast, a property P is said to be wide iff it does not supervene only on intrinsic -
physical properties. 
3. Externalism 
There are debates concerning whether a given kind of properties is intrinsic or 
relational. I shall call the doctrine that a given kind of properties K is intrinsic 
"individualism (with regard to K)” and the doctrine that a given kind of properties K 
is relational "externalism (with regard to K)". . 
There should be no doubt that externalism with regard to certain kinds of 
intentional states must be true. Remembering that p (p stands for any proposition), for 
example, is a relational intentional state. Whether or not you remember something is 
in part dependent on your history, in that to remember an incident, you must exist at 
the time when that incident occurred. Another example of relational intentional states 
is knowing that p. For, Gettier problem aside, a justified belief about a certain state of 
affairs counts as knowledge only if it is true, and whether or not a belief is true, of 
course, hinges on the environment that the epistemic subject is in. 
What is controversial is whether externalism can be extended to intentional states 
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such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. As I said in section 1, some writers hold the 
view that extemalism about beliefs and desires is also true. To argue for this doctrine, 
externalists regarding intentional states typically take two steps. First, they argue that 
the meanings of certain kinds of words are widely individuated (we can call this thesis 
"semantic extemalism"). Then, with certain plausible assumptions, they argue further 
that beliefs involving the concepts corresponding to those words are also wide 
properties. The most celebrated argument for the truth of semantic extemalism is the 
Twin-Earth thought experiment invented by Hilaiy Putnam (1975).^^ 
4. The Classical Argument for Semantic Extemalism: The Twin-Earth Thought 
Experiment 
Imagine that we go back to a time prior to modem chemistry and that there is a planet, 
Twin-Earth, elsewhere in the universe that is exactly like the earth we live on except 
for one feature. On Twin-Earth there is no H2O, but there exists a chemical compound 
XYZ, the observable and functional properties of which (e.g., being colourless, able 
to quench thirst, and tasteless), are indistinguishable from the stuff we on Earth call 
"water." Moreover, suppose that each of the inhabitants of Earth has a twin or 
duplicate on Twin-Earth, who is type-identical to each earthling down to the last 
There are some different forms of extemalism not established by twin-earth thought experiments 
(e.g., G. Evan (1982), J. McDowell ((1984), (1986)). Whether or not they are true is an interesting 
question. However, I will not discuss them in this thesis. 
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elemental^ particle,'^ and that these Twin-Earth doubles call XYZ "water." 
Now suppose that an earthling, Oscar，utters the sentence "Water is a boring drink,” 
and his twin, Oscar*, on Twin-Earth utters "Water is a boring drink." Do their 
utterances mean the same thing? Putnam thinks not, for scientists tell us that water is 
H20，and since XYZ is not H20 , it is not water. Consequently, when Oscar and his 
twin use the word "water", they are referring to different substances. In other words, 
the reference or extension of the word "water" in our mouths and in twins mouth is 
different: For earthlings "water" refers to H2O, whereas for twin-earthling, it refers to 
XYZ. And thus we should dub the compound on twin earth with a new name, say 
"twater". Now since the meaning of an utterance is partly determined by the words 
involved in it, it follows that Oscar's utterance and her twin's have different 
meanings. 
One of the main aims of the twin earth thought experiment is to show the 
incoherence of two theses endorsed by the traditional notion of meaning The first 
thesis is "that knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state" (Putnam (1973); (1993): p.l51). That is, the meanings of words 
are entirely fixed by the concepts or intentions with which the speakers associate them 
The second is the doctrine that meaning determines reference., that two terms have 
�6 Following many philosophers, I ignore the fact that whereas twins have XYZ in their bodies, we 
have H2O. 
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different references, that is, denote different things, implies a difference in their 
meanings. 
If we agree with Putnam's argument in the Twin-Earth story, we then have a case in 
which two speakers share all the same intrinsic physical properties and hence have the 
same narrow psychological states, yet the meanings of their utterances differ. Thus, if 
meaning, as the traditional theoiy suggests, is construed as a concept, which is a 
narrow psychological state, then it does not determine reference. This means that the 
two assumptions on which the traditional view of meaning rests cannot both be true. 
Consequently, if we want to preserve the thesis that meaning determines reference, as 
Putnam does, the only way to do so is to enlarge the meaning of the "meaning" of 
words in such a way that it includes certain external factors, in this case, the 
environmental factors of living in a watery world. But if so, the meanings of natural 
kind terms are "world involving, in that what one means by terms such as "water" 
depends on things external to one's body.�8 In summary, meaning is not only in the 
head, as Putnam puts it. 
Note that Twin-Earth experiment concerns only the question whether the 
meaning of one kind of term, those referring to things where a distinction can be made 
17 The term "world involving" is borrowed from Woodfield (1982). I take this word to be synonymous 
with "widely individuated." 
Note that since twin earth and our earth are generally conceived to be in the same possible world or 
universe, the above twin earth thought experiment just establishes the claim that intentional properties 
do not weakly supervene on intrinsic physical properties. 
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between the thing's appearance and the microstructure that explains its appearance, 
are widely individuated. I shall call this kind of term "natural kind terms" (they are 
sometimes also called "substance words"), and exteraalism concerning the meaning 
of such terms "natural kind term externalism. ” 
Some philosophers are quick to point out that with a little trick, we can employ 
Twin-Earth style thought experiments to show that meanings of words other than 
natural kind terms are also widely individuated. One such attempt is provided by 
Tyler Burge (1979)]9 I goes roughly as follows: 
Suppose that because of some sort of confusion or misinformation, Alf, an 
inhabitant of our earth, erroneously believes that “arthritis” means inflammation not 
only of joints but also of bones. Feeling pain in his thight, he asserts, "I have arthritis 
in my thigh." Since in our linguistic community, "arthritis" cannot apply to bones but 
only to joints, his utterance is false. Now suppose Alf^, the physical replica of Alf 
who lives in a twin earth, where all things are pretty much the same as on earth except 
that the linguistic community there uses "arthritis" to mean inflammation of joints and 
bones, produces the same sort of utterance. His utterance should be regarded as true. 
But if A l f s utterance is false, whereas M P ' s true, then we should conclude that the 
19 Note that Burge does not establish externalism with regard to terms by using twin earth experiment. 
His original formulation, rather, is to consider how the arthritis sufferer's utterance and belief should be 
ascribed in the actual situation, and in a counter/actual situation in which the language convention of 
the usage of arthritis is different from the actual one. 
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contents or truth conditions of their utterances are different. Since ex hypothesis, Alf 
and his replica agree in their intrinsic physical properties, we now have a case in 
which two individuals are identical with regard to intrinsic physical states, yet their 
utterances, though of the same type, mean different things. And since in this case the 
natural environments that the physical twins live in are relevantly identical, the only 
difference being their linguistic community, we have shown that meanings of words 
are determined not only by the natural environment but also by the linguistic 
community or social environment. I shall call this kind of extemalism "social 
extemalism". 
5. frojn Semantic Extemalism to Mental Content Extemalism 
Thus far we have an externalist account only of the semantics of terms. Some 
philosophers, however, take the moral of the Twin-Earth experiment one step further 
and use it to establish extemalism with regard to the intentional properties posited by 
folk psychology.20 They argue that intentional properties are individuated by contents, 
and contents, according to folk psychology, are construed as truth conditions or 
meanings, typically specified by means of words. Thus, assuming that when a speaker 
• 2� 
is sincere，what she means by an utterance is the content of what she believes, the 
See, e.g., C. McGinn (1977), T. Burge (1979). 
Some philosophers deny this inference (e.g., R. Cummins (1991)). 
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externalist's conclusion about meaning can thus be carried over to beliefs (and 
perhaps to other intentional states such as desires and intentions). As a result, the twin 
earth thought experiments establish not only that meaning is "world involving," but 
also that intentional states are partly individuated by the environment that the 
individual is in. 
For clarity, let's formulate the twin earth arguments for extemalism with regard to 
intentional states in the following way: 
1. In the twin-earth story, when using the word "N", the physical twins (e.g., Oscar-
Oscar* and Alf-AlP) refer to different things and so their utterances involving 
"N" have different truth conditions or meanings. 
2. When a speaker is sincere, the meaning of her utterance is the same as the content 
of her belief. 
3. Intentional states such as beliefs are individuated by their contents. 
4. The identity condition of a belief (type) is determined by or supervenient on the 
content of the belief. That is, if two belief tokens are of different types, then they 
have different contents or meanings. 
5. Thus，the physical twins have different beliefs. 
6. The physical twins，ex hypothesis, are indiscernible with regard to their intrinsic 
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physical states. 
7. Thus, the physical twins，even if they are intrinsically physically exactly alike, 
have different beliefs. 
8. Therefore in some cases two individuals may share all the same intrinsic physical 
properties but not all the same intentional states. 
More precisely, we can formulate externalism ^^  in terms of the following 
supervenience thesis: 
It is not necessary that, for any two individuals x and y, and any intentional 
property M, i f jc and j，are indiscernible with regard to all of their intrinsic physical 
properties, thenjc and j are indiscernible with regard to M. 
But if the above supervenience thesis fails, then it follows that the belief that an 
individual instantiates is partly constituted by the environment in which she is 
embedded. In short, intentional properties are widely individuated. 
A terminological note: the term "externalism" is ambiguous. Sometimes it is used by some authors 
to refer to the doctrine that intentional states are widely individuated according to our folk 
psychological practices. Yet at times it is used to denote to the normative thesis - (sometimes) 
intentional states should be widely individuated for the purposes of systematic psychological 
explanations. Some philosophers (e.g. Fodor (1987); (1991)) agrees that externalism construed as the 
actual claim is true, yet denies that it as a plausible normative claim. To avoid confusion, in what 
follows I shall preserve the name "externalism" for the doctrine about how intentional states are 
actually individuated and call the normative doctrine "anti-individualism." 
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Some philosophers remain unconvinced that the twin earth thought experiments 
successfully establish the doctrine of extemalism with regard to intentional properties. 
Nevertheless, I do not intend to get embroiled in these issues, since as I said in the 
Introduction, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether individualism is true in 
psychology. Moreover, the individualists (Stich and Fodor)^^ that I will discuss in the 
next two chapters take the above argument as decisive. In section 7, however, I shall 
examine one objection (often called "the common concept strategy") to the above 
argument, for it can help us to properly understand the nature of the doctrine of 
extemalism. Before doing this, I shall first deal with another objection to extemalism, 
which arises from a misunderstanding of physicalism. ‘ 
6. Extemalism and Physicalism 
At first sight, there appears to be a conflict between extemalism and physicalism 
about the mental. Very roughly, (ontological) physicalism is the view that mental 
properties must in some sense hinge on physical properties (those posited by the best 
current theories of fundamental physics). Having rejected central state theory or the 
type identity theory of mind,24 some philosophers think that physicalism should be 
23 See, e.g., Stich (1978) and Fodor (1987: ch 2). 
Crudely, the type identity theory can be formulated as follows. For any mental property M (pain), if 
an object o instantiates it, then there exists a brain property B (e.g., c-fiber activation) such that o 
instantiates M at time t iff it instantiates B at t. This theory holds that the correlation between mental 
properties and brain properties are not accidential but law-like, and they are discovered in an empirical 
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characterized by the thesis of mind-brain supervenience, which is usually expressed 
by the claim that there can be no difference at the level of the mental without any 
difference in the brain (see the indiscemibility formulation of supervenience in 
section 3). In other words, if we find that two individuals have distinct mental states, 
then if physicalism is true, we will expect that there must be corresponding changes in 
the individuals' brain states. This, however, seems to clash with extemalism. For ex 
hypothesis, the protagonists of the twin earth story are exactly alike with respect to 
25 
their intrinsic physical properties and hence also their brain properties. But if 
extemalism is right, then it sounds as if there can be a difference in intentional 
properties without a corresponding change of brain state. This view seems to allow 
that intentional properties can 'float free ’ from the physical and thus might seem like 
a kind of return to dualism. 
A little reflection, however, will reveal that this objection is based on an 
implausible conception of physicalism. To avoid dualism, we need not stipulate so 
strictly that the supervenient bases of intentional properties comprise only intrinsic 
properties, or physical properties within the boundaiy of individuals' bodies. All that 
way. It is generally agreed that construed as a theory about what mental states of the same type have in 
common, the type identity theory fails, since it is incompatible with one generally accepted view that 
mental properties (and indeed other non-basic (properties other than those posited by fundamental 
physics) are multiply realizable. It roughly asserts that for any mental property M, there could be more 
than one brain property instantiating M (see, e.g., Putnam (1967)). The classical statement of the 
identity theory can be found in Smart (1959). 
It is generally agreed that brain properties supervene on intrinsic physical properties. 
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that is required is that the supervenient bases of intentional properties all be physical 
facts. So, providing that relational properties are also physical facts (as indeed they 
are), extemalism is perfectly consistent with physicalism. 
7. The Common Concept. Strategy Objection to Extemalism. 
Now let's return to the extemalism argument. One main assumption on which the 
argument for extemalism rests is that a given term used by the physical twins in the 
Twin-Earth stoiy refers to different things (premise 1). Some philosophers, however, 
find this assumption doubtful, since it is not the case that our semantic intuitions must 
take the terms in question to refer to different things. To illustrate, consider the natural 
kind term or substance word "water". The objectors ask, what is wrong with saying 
that by "water" both speakers mean the same thing? For after all, the liquid filling the 
lakes and rives on twin earth, though having a chemical structure different from H2O, 
• is functionally and observably completely indistinguishable from that on earth. Given 
this, why can't we take the extensions or references of "water" uttered by Oscar and 
his twin to be the same - both are substances having the properties of being colourless, 
tasteless, able to quench thirst, and so on. As Tim Crane puts it: 
At the very least, it can be argued that our intuitive linguistic judgements do not settle the 
question whether XYZ is water; if, for example, it were discovered that what we 
pre-theoretically regard as water had many different underlying inicrostmctures, maybe 
See, Botterill and Carruthers (1999): p. 148. 
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three or four, maybe more, what should we conclude? It is implausible to suppose that our 
linguistic practices must dictate an answer a priori, so that we already know now what we 
would say about this case (Crane's emphasis) ((2002): p. 123). 
So it seems that one can say instead that both H2O and XYZ are water, but have 
different m i c r o s t r u c t u r e s ? ? Indeed, we actually call some substances superficially 
similar to H2O but with different chemical structure "water," such as the chemical 
compound heavy water, which has the molecular formula D2O. 
Perhaps some may accept this objection, but point out that it has force only in 
some cases, where the word in •question is not a real natural kind term, of which 
"water" is an example. But when we come across a real natural kind term "N" and 
discover that the substances it denotes are discernible with regard to their underlying 
microstructures - that is, what we pre-theoretically regard as N indeed have many 
different microstructures - we should dub them with different names, and say that 
only some are really N. 
But what kinds of terms are really natural kind terms? Of course we cannot say 
that whenever we find a situation in which we individuate the microstructure of a 
substance rather than its observable features, then the term denoting the substance is a 
real natural kind term, for surely this definition is circular. Some may propose names 
of chemical elements as one kind of the candidate. However, this proposal fails, since 
anyone who studied chemistry will remember that some elements have isotopes 一 
27 Objections of this kind can be found in Mellor (1977) and T. Crane (199” . 
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elements having the same number of protons yet different numbers of neutrons. 
Differing in number of neutrons is certainly differing in microstructure. But we still 
call the isotopes of an element by the name for that element 一 for instance, all isotopes 
of chlorine are called "chlorine." It seems very hard to find an informative and 
non-circular definition of "natural kind terms." 
Moreover, it should be plausible to suppose that one of the central goals of 
science is to discover the microstructures of things. This，accompanied by the claim 
that the internal structures of things determine what they are, seems to suggest that 
science must have the last word in determining what words mean. But isn't this a 
form of scientific chauvinism? This point is nicely put by McCulloch: 
It is natural to suppose that the principle underlying [Putnam's] strategy is that where there 
is a difference discerned by the relevant science - chemistry in this case - there we have to 
agree that there is an ultimate, or absolute difference. And this might seem unwairantably 
deferential to science ((1995): p. 172). 
Suppose that feeling regular sharp headache that I long ago learned to call 
"pounding headache," I decide to see a doctor. The doctor tells me that I don't have a 
pounding headache at all, for my brain does not show the pattern that pounding 
headache sufferers must exhibit - that is, the neurophysiological configuration of 
pounding headache. But is she justified to say this? Some English speakers may say 
No, since they may use "pounding headache" to refer to a particular kind of feeling or 
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qualia, regardless of its microstmctural constitution.'^ 
We can summarize the objections just discussed as follows. It is not the case that 
our practices with substance words necessarily conform to Putnam's description - that 
is, it is not the case that when we find that instances of N, though superficially exactly 
alike, are discernible with regard to their microstructures, we inevitably judge them to 
be different things and thereby assign them different names. Indeed, there actually are 
some cases in which we do not individuate substances by their underlying structures 
(e.g., isotopes). 
Plausible as this objection may sound, this common concept strategy is misguided. 
Establishing semantic externalism with regard to natural kind terms need not show 
that our use of substance words must follow the pattern Putnam describes. What is 
required is just that there could be a case in which our practice of using substance 
words meshes with Putnam's examples. That is, we can imagine a possible situation 
in which (1) we have a term "N" denoting a kind of thing N, where the distinction can 
be made between its appearance and underlying microstructure, and (2) we discover 
that not all instances of N have the same underlying microstructure, and (3) we judge 
that only some are N and thereby call them "N." If conditions ( l ) - ( 3 ) are all satisfied, 
then the truth of this kind of semantic externalism is established. Assuming the truth 
I borrow this example from G. McCulloch ((1995): p.173) 
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of premises 2 a ^ H ^ ^ ^ & h l ^ l ^ e ^ l i — t i o n a l states is also established. .. 
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Chapter 3: Stick Argument for Individualism: The Aim of 
Psychology Argument 
As I pointed out in the Introduction and the previous chapter, the eliminativist's 
argument works only if individualism is a plausible constraint on scientific 
psychology. In this chapter I shall examine an argument for individualism that I shall 
call "the aim of psychology argument". I call it this because it derives individualism 
mainly from a conception of the aim of psychology, namely that psychology ought to 
concern itself only with explaining and predicting autonomous or narrow behaviour. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 1 I shall provide a sketch of 
the argument from below presented by Stich (1978，1983)^^ and point out that the 
argument as it stands does not work, for one of its premises is false. In sections 2 and 
3 I shall explain how by drawing a distinction between autonomous and wide 
behaviour, Stich modifies his argument and why he thinks that the truth of 
individualism provides a route to the eliminativist's conclusion. In section 4 I shall 
point out that Stich has no a priori argument for the claim that psychology must 
concern itself only with autonomous behaviour. Nor is the claim supported by the 
actual practices of psychology. In sections 5 and 6,1 shall point out that one argument 
implicit in Fodor's Psychoseinantics may be regarded as an a priori argument for this 
Note that Stich (1996) repudiates this argument for individualism. 
A 
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claim. However, the argument fails, since Fodor confuses causation with 
individuation. Finally, I shall argue that Stich's argument is invalid. 
1. St ick�s Argument for Individualism 
Stich espouses individualism on the basis of the principle of autonomy, according to 
which "the states and processes that ought to be of concern to the psychologist are 
those that supervene on the current, internal, physical states of the organism." To put 
it in another way, "Any differences between organisms which do not manifest 
themselves as differences in their current, internal, physical states ought to be ignored 
by a psychological theory" (1983: p. 164; see also (1978)) 
Stich calls properties that supervene on the current, internal, physical states of 
the organism "autonomous properties." The autonomy principle is intended to provide 
us with a normative constraint on how explanatoiy categories in scientific psychology 
should be individuated; that is, how mental states should be typed for the purposes of 
constructing scientific psychological theories. 
But why should psychology respect this principle? To establish the truth of his 
version of individualism, Stich devises a now often-discussed thought experiment that 
he calls the "replacement argument". Suppose that a scientist succeeded in building a 
duplication machine, which can record a person's momentary internal physical states. 
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Now suppose also that you are placed in a duplication machine. After the scientist 
records all of your intrinsic physical features at a particular time t, a physical replica 
(or “replacement,，，as Stich calls it) of you is produced. Stich claims that since you 
and your replacement share the same momentary autonomous states, the two of you 
will behave in the same way in all actual and possible situations. 
Now if we agree that "psychology is the science which aspires to explain 
behaviour," argues Stich, then it should be plausible to conclude that in articulating 
theories to explain human behaviour, psychology should be concerned only with 
autonomous properties. Or, equivalently, "any states or processes or properties which 
are not shared by [you] and [your] identically behaving replica must surely be 
irrelevant to psychology" (1983, pp.155-56). In short, psychology should respect the 
autonomy principle. We can reconstruct the above argument for individualism as 
follows: 
1 • Any two individuals who are indiscernible with regard to autonomous properties 
(e.g., you and your replacement) must behave in the same way in all 
circumstances. 
2. Scientific psychology aims to explain actual and possible behaviour - that is, how 
an object will behave in various actual and hypothetical situations. 
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3. Thus any states, properties, or processes not shared by autonomously identical 
individuals should be omitted by psychology. 
4. Thus psychology should concern itself only with autonomous properties. 
Stich admits that though "there is an important kernel of truth" (1983, p. 166) in the 
replacement argument, as it stands, it fails to establish the autonomy principle because 
premise 1 is false. It seems easy to conceive of situations in which two individuals are 
autonomously identical, yet do not behave in the same way. To see this, consider one 
such case provided by Stich (1983, p. 166). Suppose that you own a car and are going 
to sell it to your friend. Unfortunately, after being duplicated, you are kidnapped and 
instead of you, your replacement goes to sell the car. Unaware of the fact that you 
have been replaced by a replica, your friend signs the documents and the transaction 
is successfully completed. But in this situation, your replacement's behaviour, such as, 
signing the documents, receiving the cheque, and so forth, cannot be rightly described 
as selling the car, since she did not own it in the first place. Similarly, the following 
provides a counterexample to premise 1. Suppose that before being duplicated you 
promised Aim to help her complete a term paper and that after the duplication you 
died and your replacement goes to help Ann instead. Now even if your replacement 
helps Ann exactly as you would, were you there, your replacement's behaviour could 
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not properly be described as fulfilling your promise, since it did not make a promise 
to Ann before. 
2 Narrow and Wide Behaviour 
To refine the argument, Stich distinguishes between two kinds of behaviourial 
description: autonomous behavioural and wide behavioural descr ip t ion?�The former 
construes behaviour just as definite spatially-temporally defined movement of the 
body. Behaviour so described thus can be specified in purely physical or geometrical 
terms. Opening one's month, moving one's arms at so many meters per second, and 
contracting the biceps all can be regarded as examples of autonomous behaviour. 
Adopting wide behavioural descriptions means that behaviour is not just construed as 
physical movement but taxonomized in a way that takes account of the context in 
which bodily motions occur. Though how to characterize "context" precisely is a hard 
question, the following rough characterization seems to be on the right track. Instead 
of seeing a context as a particular like a space-time region, we can think of a context 
as a set of properties of an individual's environment and history. A physical behaviour 
is anchored in a context if and only if it bears a certain appropriate relation to the set 
In the current literature on philosophy of mind, wide causal power so characterized is often called 
"action" and "intentionally characterized behaviour". 
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of properties characterized by that�context, A wide behavioural description 
construes behaviour as a hybrid relational property, in that the identity of a given wide 
behaviour is fixed by two factors: a certain bodily movement and a particular context. 
Opening the fridge, turning on the lamp, and making a cake all count as wide 
behaviours, since an individual can instantiate them only if her environment is 
amenable - for example, one can instantiate the behavioural type of opening the 
fridge only if she is in an environment that contains a fridge. Selling a car and 
fulfilling one's promise are also two examples of wide behavioural types, since tokens 
of them need to instantiate not only certain bodily movement types but also certain 
historical facts. 
It is not hard to see that tokens of the same type of autonomous behaviour may 
count as distinct types of wide behaviour in different contexts. For instance, adopting 
autonomous behavioral descriptions, Oscar's and Oscar*'s verbal tokening of "bring 
me water" are behaviours of the same type (they consist of a particular form of 
vibration of the vocal cords). But they are distinct types of wide behaviour, since they 
are anchored in different contexts. Moreover, tokens of different types of autonomous 
behaviour may be counted as the same type of wide behaviour in the same context. 
Instances of the wide behavioural type selling a car may not all possess all the same 
31 This account of context is similar to that provided by D. M. Walsh (1999 p. 633). A more detailed 
account of how context enters into the fixation of behaviour can be found in Enc (1995). 
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bodily movement types. For example, two sets of tokens of distinct types of bodily 
movements can be instances of selling a car, if the individuals that engage in the 
movements possess certain histories, namely owning a car before. 
3. Refining the Argument 
It is surely true, Stich admits, that under a wide or commonsense taxonomy of 
behaviour, which individuates behaviour in such a way that it takes account of the 
causal histories of individuals, as the above counterexample to premise 1 does, in 
some situations two autonomously identical individuals will be described as 
instantiating different behavioural types. Be that as it may, it seems plausible to expect 
that two autonomously identical individuals will engage in the same autonomous 
behaviour. Thus premise 1 of the above argument can be refined as follows: 
1*. Any two individuals who are indiscernible with regard to autonomous properties 
(e.g., you and your replacement) must behave in the same way in all 
circumstances, where behaviour is understood as autonomous behaviour. 
Stich then goes on to point out that there is no reason to require that psychology must 
adopt the wide or commonsense conception of behaviour. Like other scientific 
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disciplines, in explaining the phenomena that fall within its scope, psychology should 
devise its proprietary taxonomies. And so we should not expect that behaviour under 
all imagined descriptions must be explained by psychology. "Rather, the psychologist 
must select or formulate an appropriate descriptive language for his explananda. And 
the formulation of such a vocabulary will be a fundamental part of psychological 
theory construction" ((1983): p. 167). The behavioural description that psychology 
should adopt, according to Stich, is the autonomous behavioural description. Premise 
2 thus can be modified as follows: 
2*. Scientific psychology ought to concern itself only with explaining (actual and 
possible) behaviour described autonomously. 
According to Stich, psychology should be expected to explain and predict the 
occurrences of autonomous behaviour but not wide behaviour. Behaviour is generally 
regarded as a causal consequence of intentional states. So, in offering explanations 
and predictions of behaviour, psychologists need to identify the nomic mental causes 
(intentional states) of behaviour and formulate causal generalizations in terms of those 
causes. And though individuals can form their particular intentional states in a variety 
of ways, "it is their being in those states but not how they come to have them that is 
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relevant to their subsequent behaviour" (Wilson (1995): p.7) (my emphasis). As a 
result, in devising psychological generalizations, psychologists should ignore states 
not shared by individuals and their physical replicas, since it suffices to explain 
autonomous behaviour solely by properties 'in the head' — those properties that 
supervene on intrinsic physical ones. 
The following case (see diagram (a)/^ may help explain why Stich thinks that 
non-autonomous properties are causally irrelevant to autonomous behaviour. 
Lorraine causally me / H i ! � 
relevant V Lorraine!^ 
^ causally relevant 
A • B 
人 A 
Diagram (b) 
Suppose I see Lorraine. She is causally relevant to my producing state A, a 
stimulation of my visual cortex. After A interacts with certain information stored in 
my memory, I recognize her and state B, my thought that the girl standing there is 
Lorraine, is produced. State B, in turn, brings about a certain behaviour, say, 
The diagram is borrowed with minor modifications from K. Sterelny (1990, p. 34), though he uses it 
to demonstrate a slightly different point. 
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producing the noise "Hi, Lorraine “ by vibrating my vocal cord, waving my hand, 
smiling, and so on. In this case, we can say that state A is causally relevant to state B, 
that is, my having state A is partly caused by my mental representation of Lorraine. 
But it seems that the external condition (the presence of Lorraine) that causes me to 
be in state A, the causal ancestry of state A, is causally potent neither to my being in 
state B nor to my autonomously behavioural outputs, in that B and the behaviours it 
causes would be produced irrespective of A's actual casual ancestry. For example, 
consider a counterfactual situation in which the stimulation of my visual cortex is not 
caused by Lorraine herself but by her hologram, assuming that what is going on in my 
brain is the same, state B would still be produced. Likewise, we can indeed conceive 
of various counterfactual situations in which state B would be triggered by state A， 
even if A was not caused by Lorraine herself. 
Similarly, in Stich's replacement thought experiment, the causal ancestry of the 
autonomous properties of your replica and you are different: whereas your 
replacement's were produced by the scientist, yours were gradually formed by your 
interactions with your environment. But if explaining behaviour is the only concern of 
psychology, the causal ancestry of your and your replacement's autonomous 
properties "ought to be ignored by a psychological theoiy" ((1983): p. 164). 
As Stich points out, if individualism is true, it poses an eliminativist threat to 
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folk psychology. As we saw in the Introduction, folk psychology includes a great deal 
of nomological generalizations couched in terms of the contents of intentional states. 
And as I pointed out in the previous chapter, according to extemalism, to a large 
extent, contents are non-autonomous properties, in the sense that they do not 
supervene on intrinsic physical properties. But if Stich's argument successfully 
establishes that the properties involved in the generalizations of scientific psychology 
must be autonomous, it follows that intentional states, because they are 
non-autonomous, cannot legitimately be employed by scientific psychology. As a 
result, folk psychology cannot be a part of scientific psychology. This, together with 
the claim that science is the measure of all things - only entities and properties 
posited by the sciences are real or genuine - leads us to eliminativism about folk 
psychology. 
Stich not only agrees with the externalists that the contents of intentional states 
posited by folk psychology are non-individualist, but cheerfully accepts the 
conclusion of the eliminativist's argument. One of the main reasons he does so is that 
he holds that psychologists can do their work without making use of the notion of 
con ten t " However, not all philosophers think that eliminativism is tolerable. As a 
result, those who accept the conclusion of extemalism, yet agree that individualism is 
33 Stich's view of this is supported by his syntactic theory of mind, a theory intermediate between 
neurophysiology and intentional psychology. 
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a proper constraint on scientific psychology, try to save folk psychology by 
developing a notion of content that is autonomous. In the next chapter I shall discuss 
one such attempt, Fodor's account of narrow content. 
4, Is The Replacement Argument Successful in Establishing Individualism? 
Stich thinks that his argument for individualism is a sound one. But is it? Let's first 
focus on premise 2*. Note that 2* is in fact a conjunction of two separate doctrines, as 
follows: 
2(a)* Scientific psychology should explain nothing but behaviour, that is, the only 
explananda of psychology should be behaviour, and 
2(b)* Behaviours explained by psychology must be described autonomously. 
Now one might doubt that psychology should obey this normative constraint. We can 
agree with Stich that autonomous behaviour is among the explananda of psychology. 
But why should psychology aspire to explain nothing but autonomous behaviour? 
Isn't this constraint too restrictive? One way to evaluate whether or not a normative 
constraint on a given discipline is a plausible one, I think，is to examine whether that 
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discipline as it is actually practiced conforms to it. If it fails to do so, the plausibility 
of the constraint in question will be undermined. So，if we find that contrary to what 
Stich expects, psychology is not just concerned with explaining autonomous 
behaviour, then his argument for individualism in psychology cannot be sound 
because one of its premises is false. 
Unfortunately, construed as an actual claim, 2 (a)* seems to be false simply 
because the explananda of some branches of psychology are not behaviour at all. As 
Eckardt points out, the central aim of cognitive psychology is to explain cognitive or 
mental capacities，such as language understanding and problem solving in logic， 
rather than behaviour. She writes that: 
The explanandum of cognitive science is not exclusively autonomous behavior for the 
simple reason that most of the time it is not behaviour at all, autonomous or otherwise. 
Rather, the basic aim of cognitive sciences is to explain the human cognitive capacities -
what they are, how they are exercised, in virtue of what we have them, and how they 
interact (my emphasis) ((1993): p.258). 
Of course, as Eckardt goes on to point out, the explananda of cognitive psychology 
sometimes are behaviour,. in the sense that exercises of some cognitive capacities 
involve behaviour (e.g., speech production). However, this fact cannot save 2(a)*, 
since it is surely untrue that the explananda of cognitive psychology are nothing but 
behaviour. 
Another way to evaluate whether a normative constraint is a plausible one is to 
examine whether it is supported by a priori grounds - whether it can be derived from 
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certain plausible metaphysical doctrines. However, to my knowledge, Stich provides 
no such argument. Perhaps an argument implicit in Fodor's Psychosemantics may be 
used to support premise 2 Let's turn to it now. 
5. Fodor Argument for Premise 2 *; Narrow Behaviour and Crazy Causal 
Mechanisms 
Fodor's argument, which has the structure of a reductio ad absurdum, can be roughly 
summarized thus. Psychology that adopts wide behavioural descriptions is committed 
to postulating impossible causal laws. Since such laws should be avoided, psychology 
should not adopt wide behavioural descriptions. 
It is generally agreed by philosophers that behaviour is decisive in determining 
whether or not two individuals' intentional states agree in their causal powers :�� If 
two individuals instantiate the same type of behaviour in all actual and possible 
circumstances, then the intentional states of the two individuals agree in their causal 
powers. To put it in a slogan, “[s]ame type of behaviour, same causal powers; 
different types of behaviour, different causal powers" (Macdonald (1995), p. 164). 
And adopting wide behavioural descriptions implies that the intentional states of 
physical twins do not agree in their causal powers, since, as we have seen in section 3, 
34 The argument in Fodor (1991) may be seen as another one for premise 2*. 
35 Crudely, to say that an object has a particular causal power is to say that it can do or cause some 
effect in certain circumstances. The notion of causal powers will be explained in the next chapter. 
4 6 
if behaviours are described widely rather than autonomously, there will be some 
situations in which two autonomously identical individuals (physical twins) behave 
differently. By the behavioural criterion for the sameness of the causal powers of 
mental states, it follows that the physical twins' intentional states are distinct in their 
causal powers. And so we have a case in which two individuals share all the same 
autonomous properties, and yet they differ in causal powers. This violates the 
following doctrine, metaphysical individualism. 
(MI): The causal powers of anything supervene on the intrinsic physical properties 
of that thing. 
However, according to Fodor, violating (MI), that is, denying that physical duplicates 
agreeing in all the same causal powers, requires us to postulate causal mechanisms 
that he thinks mad, crazy, or impossible. 
To illustrate this point, Fodor invites us to consider the following case. Call a 
particle an "H-particle at time f" iff a particular dime of Fodor's is heads up and a 
particle a "T-particle at time f , iff the dime is tails up (1987: p.33). And call the 
possible world in which the orientation of Fodor's dime is heads up "H world" and 
A more detailed account of the nature of content of this principle will be explained in the next 
chapter. 
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that in which it is tails up "T-world" respectively. Then Fodor can change every 
particle in the universe from H-particle to T-particle and back again by merely 
turning over his dime. Do H-particles and T-particles agree in their causal powers? 
That is to ask, in taxonomizing explanantia of causal explanations of the behaviour of 
these particles, should we conform to (MI)? Fodor argues that the answer must be Yes. 
For ex hypothesis, both H and T particles are exactly alike with regard to their 
intrinsic physical properties. If we type-distinguish their explanantia in explaining 
their behaviour, that is, regard them as disagreeing in causal powers, this means that 
there could be differences in the causal powers of particles without differences in their 
intrinsic physical properties. This implies that the differences in causal powers are due 
to things external to the particles. And since the only difference between them is their 
contexts 一 H-particles are in H world, T-particles are in T world - the change in 
causal powers must be caused by their environments - specified by the orientation of 
Fodor's dime. This means that there are causal mechanisms or laws that mediate the 
dependency between the orientation of Fodor's dime and the particles' causal powers 
without any change in the particles ’ intrinsic physical properties. But such causal 
mechanisms, according to Fodor, are crazy. 
Perhaps what grounds Fodor's claim that violating (MI) will involve postulating 
crazy causal mechanisms is a conviction about causation - that causation must be 
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‘local,，in the sense that for any physically constituted event to cause another one that 
occurs at a considerable distance, the cause must trigger a causal chain in such a way 
that each physically constituted event within the chain must be contiguous to its 
immediate cause and to its immediate effect.^^ This view is generally accepted by 
philosophers because denying it seems to commit us to a case of action at a distance. 
Seeing physical twins as differing in the causal powers of their intentional states 
is analogous to the H-T particle case in respect to taxonomic practices. Since the 
physical twins, ex hypothesis, are autonomously identical, the difference in the causal 
powers of their intentional states must be explained by postulating crazy causal 
mechanisms 一 causal laws that enable a subject's environment to affect the causal 
powers of her intentional states without affecting her physiology. However, Fodor 
thinks that: 
there is no such mechanism; you can't affect the causal powers of a person's mental states 
without affecting his physiology. That is not a conceptual claim or a metaphysical claim, of 
course. It is a contingent fact about how God made the world. God made the world such 
that the mechanisms by which environmental variables affect organic behaviours run via 
their effects on the organism's nervous system, or so, at least, all the physiologists I know 
assure me. (1987: p.40) 
To avoid postulating such crazy causal mechanisms, Fodor thus concludes that 
psychology should employ narrow or autonomous behavioural descriptions rather 
than wide ones. For clarity, let's reconstruct his argument as follows: 
“ S e e Cain (2002): p. 164. 
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1. If psychology adopts wide behavioural descriptions, then there must be some 
situations in which the behaviour (tokens) of physical twins are regarded as type 
distinct. 
2. If there are some situations in which the behaviours of physical twins do not 
belong to the same type, then their intentional states do not agree in their causal 
powers. 
3. So，if wide behavioural descriptions are adopted, then the intentional states of 
physical twins do not agree in their causal powers. 
4. That physical twins differ in the causal powers of their intentional states, however, 
implies that there are causal laws that mediate between the environments and the 
causal powers of twins. 
5. So, the laws that correlate the twins' environments and the causal powers of their 
intentional states must be ones that can cause some changes in their causal powers 
without affecting their intrinsic physical properties Csince ex hypothesis, physical 
twins are identical with respect to their intrinsic physical properties). Such causal 
laws are crazy or mad or impossible. 
6. So，if postulating impossible causal laws is to be avoided, psychology should not 
adopt wide behavioural descriptions. 
7. So, the only behavioural descriptions that psychology ought to adopt are 
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autonomous or narrow behavioural descriptions. 
6. Causal Non-Causal (Constitutive) powers 
Premise 1 seems to be true. And assuming the behavioural criterion for causal powers 
of intentional states, premise 2 is true as well However, is it true that admitting that 
the causal powers of intentional states of an individual can be changed by its 
environment without changes to the individual's physiological properties 
(autonomous properties) inevitably commits to causal mechanisms that Fodor thinks 
are crazy? Probably not, for there seem to be two different ways in which an object 
can acquire causal powers from its environment. 
It is surely true that in some cases an object acquires causal powers from its 
environment (or that the environment affects or changes the causal powers of an 
object) because of causal laws that mediate the dependency between the object and its 
environment. For example, that an iron bar acquires the causal power of being 
magnetic in virtue of its proximity to a magnet is explained by causal laws that 
involve changes in the mirco-composition of the bar. It is the bar's environment (its 
proximity to a magnet) that causes the iron bar to have the causal power of being 
magnetic.38 Another example is provided by Fodor's passage quoted above. The 
See Cain (2002): p. 162. 
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effect of an individual's environment on his neurophysiological properties is 
explained by causal laws that involve changes in the individual's intrinsic physical 
properties. Be that as it may，it is not the case that an object must acquire causal 
powers from its environment in this way. An object can acquire a particular causal 
power by being embedded in an appropriate context. In other words，causal powers of 
this kind are constitutive rather than causal. Call this kind of causal powers "wide 
causal powers” 
So, in saying that the environment changes or makes a difference to the causal 
powers of the intentional states of the physical twins, one is not committed to the 
claim that such changes are caused by the individual's environment. As Egan put this 
point:39 
Fodor's argument, however, simply misconstrues the anti-individualist's position. The 
proper constnial of the anti-individualist claim is not that differences in the environments 
cause a difference in the twin's mental states, but rather that environmental (contextual) 
factors are relevant to the type-individuation of their mental states. Our theories, and the 
taxonomies employed by them, are not caused by the world in any direct sense. In claiming 
that psychological taxonomy is sensitive to contextual factors the anti-individualist is not 
postulating any mysterious causal processes (Egan's emphasis) ((1991): p. 189). 
Perhaps Fodor can deny the legitimacy of wide causal powers by arguing that wide 
causal powers (causal powers that are not causal but constitutive) are not real or 
genuine causal powers'^^ or that wide causal powers should not be recognized by 
39 Similar objections can be found in Surge (1986) and Cain (2002). 
40 Perhaps it may be little strange to say that wide causal powers are not causal. To ease this worry, we 
may delete the word "causal", just calling it "wide powers". 
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'real' sciences. However, Fodor does not argue for this. To be sure, in many scientific 
disciplines causal powers are not wide (e.g., magnetism, solubility, and c-fiber 
activation). "But nothing about science in general can be read off from this fact" (Cain 
(2002): p. 163). Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, wide causal powers are 
prevalent in the taxonomy of explanatory kinds in various scientific disciplines. 
If the above reasoning is right, then premise 4 is false. And so Fodor's argument 
for 2* is unsound. 
7. Conclusion: Stich�s Unsuccessful Argument for The Principle of Autonomy 
Even if we grant that the only aim of psychology is to explain autonomous behaviour, 
does Stich successfully rule out all non-autonomous or relational properties as 
illegitimate to psychology? It seems not. Comparing Stich's replacement thought 
experiment with Putnam's and Burge's may help to illustrate this point. In all of these 
thought experiments the autonomous properties of the protagonists, ex hypothesis, are 
identical; what varies is just one kind of non-autonomous property. Whereas in 
Putnam's thought experiment, it is the natural environment in which the individuals 
live that varies, in Burge's, the only difference between the individuals is their 
linguistic and social environment. But in the scenario Stich describes, while the causal 
histories of the autonomous properties of the physically identical twins vary, other 
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non-autonomous properties related to their natural, linguistic, social, and cultural 
environment remain wholly unchanged. So the argument at most shows that one kind 
of non-autonomous property - historical properties or the causal ancestry of 
autonomous properties - is redundant and hence explanatorily irrelevant to 
psychological explanations. It remains silent on the question of whether other kinds of 
non-autonomous properties, such as natural and social environmental properties, are 
irrelevant/' And so it fails to establish the claim that psychology should include only 
42 
autonomous properties as proper scientific explanatory kinds. 
Do individualists have other routes to their doctrine? In the next chapter I shall 
discuss another argument for individualism provided by Fodor, which derives 
individualism mainly from a doctrine concerning how the explanantia of psychology 
should be individuated. 
41 As I shall show in the next chapter, there is indeed a sense in which natural environmental facts are 
relevant to explaining autonomous behaviour. 
42 See Eckert (1993): p. 156. 
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Chapter4: Fodor's Argument for Individualism: The 
Explanan Argument 
In the previous chapter, I examined an argument for individualism from a normative 
claim about how the explananda of psychology should be taxonomized. I concluded 
that it fails because there is no cogent reason to require psychology to concern itself 
only with narrow or autonomous behaviour. 
Other than arguing for individualism from the aim of psychology, one can argue 
for individualism from how the explanantia of psychology should be individuated (I 
call this type of argument “the explanan argument”衫).Fodor (1987: ch 2) presents 
one such argument, which can be summarized roughly as follows: explanatory 
categories or kinds devised by the sciences must be individuated by their causal 
powers. The causal powers are determined by or supervenient on intrinsic physical 
properties. So, if psychology is intended to be a scientific discipline, the explanatory 
kinds it employs must be autonomous properties, or those that supervene on intrinsic 
physical properties. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In section 1 I shall provide a sketch of 
# 
Fodor's argument from above. Then in section 2，I discuss Fodor's attempt to 
reconcile folk psychology and individualism by working out a different kind of 
43 Note that in the current literature on philosophy of mind this type of argument is usually called "the 
argument from causal powers" (e.g. Wilson (1995)，Cain (2002)). 
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content: narrow content. In section 3 I shall argue that contrary to what Fodor thinks, 
global individualism cannot be derived simply from an uncontroversial view about 
how explanantia should be typed Nor does it conform to the fact that explanantia in 
various sciences are relationally taxonomized. I will discuss various possible 
modifications of global individualism to account for this fact. However, I shall 
argue that none of them is successful, since such refinements turn Fodor's argument 
into an invalid one. 
1. Fodor，s Explanan Argument . 
According to Fodor, one of the central goals of the sciences is to explain phenomena 
by constructing causal explanations. In doing so, different scientific disciplines should 
devise their own proprietary behavioural descriptions {explananda) and explanantia. 
Fodor takes it for granted that in general causal explanations provided by the sciences 
involve a matter of subsuming events to be explained under certain projecting and 
confirming causal laws or generalizations)^ Causal laws "subsume the things they 
apply to in virtue of the causal properties of the things they apply to" (Fodor (1987): 
P.34).45 TO explain why an event token e l , which belongs to event type E l , occurred, 
requires (typically) specifying a prior event token e2，which belongs to event type E2, 
See, e.g., (1987), p. 34’ 0994) , p. 3’ (1998), p.7. 
杉 The above passage indicates that Fodor adopts a Humean account of causation and Hempel's 
account of causal explanation. 
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and a causal generalization or law, the antecedent and consequent of which are E l and 
E2, respectively. For example, the event of a toy truck's accelerating 10 ms can be 
causally explained by subsuming it under Newton's second law and the fact it was 
acted on by a force of 20 newtons and has a mass of 10 kg.46 Similarly, that an object 
has a certain kinetic energy is explained by its being subsumed under the law that 
kinetic energy = 1/2 x mass x velocity2. 
Fodor argues that in constructing causal generalizations, the sciences must 
taxonomize their explanatory kinds (their explanantia) in a way that respects the 
following methodological principle, which he calls "global methodological 
individualism ”： 
(GI): Explanatory kinds or categories in the sciences must be individuated by their 
causal powers47. 
(GI) provides scientific disciplines with a normative guide to how things, states of 
things, and whatever, are classified: anything with the same causal powers should be 
regarded as belonging to the same kind. In other words, according to (GI) any 
姑 More precisely, we should say that the event is explained by an instance of Newton's 2nd law of 
motion. 
"Categorizatiofi in science is characlerislically taxonomy by causal poM>ers, “ as Fodor ((1987): 
p.44) puts it. 
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classification scheme that groups things under different kinds if they agree in causal 
powers must be counted as scientifically illegitimate. Same causal poM>ers, same 
scientific kinds, to put (GI) in a slogan. 
But what is it for something to have a causal power, according to Fodorl To a 
first approximation, to say that a thing (an individual, an object, an event, and the like) 
possesses a particular causal power is to say that it has a capacity to do something or 
cause certain effects in certain nomologically possible contexts. Typically, causal 
powers are characterized by conditional or hypothetical statements having the form 
"If ... then." For example, to say that a sugar cube has the causal power of being 
soluble in water (or the disposition to dissolve in water) is to say that if immersed in 
water, then it will dissolve. To claim that a mental state (token) has certain causal 
powers is to claim that it has the capacities to bring about certain effects, namely 
behaviours and other mental states, in certain contexts. 
There are two main analyses of causal powers: instrumental and realistic. 
According to the former，to ascribe certain causal powers to a thing is just to cite the 
fact that certain true conditional statements hold for it. Thus, causal powers such as 
being soluble in water, on this view, are hypothetical or conditional properties of 
objects - dissolving if immersed in water. The latter, by contrast, takes causal powers 
Crudely, nomologically possible contexts or circumstances are those in which no natural laws are 
violated. 
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as categorical internal stales that causally explain why certain conditional statements 
hold for the object. 
One should note that causal power is a counterfactual-involving notion, in the sense 
that something can have a particular causal power even if it never exercises it. For 
example, a sugar cube can count as possessing the causal power of being soluble 
without ever exercising that power. All that is required is a disposition such that had it 
been immersed in water, it would have dissolved. As a result, in determining whether 
or not an object possesses a particular causal power，we need to consider how it 
behaves not only in actual cases but also in hypothetical situations. "You have to 
judge identity and difference of causal powers in a way that bears the counterfactuals 
in mind" ((1991): p.8), as Fodor reminds us. 
With the notion of what it is for an object to have a causal power, Fodor can now 
formulate his proposed criterion of the identity of causal powers: "identity of causal 
powers is identity of causal consequences across nomologically possible contexts" 
(1987, p.44). More precisely, it can be formulated as follows: 
Two objects a, b have the same causal powers just in case for all nomologically 
possible contexts or circumstances C, if a can cause certain effects in C, then so can 
object b, even if b in fact is not in C. Or, to put the same point alternatively, if two 
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objects possess all the same causal powers, then all true hypotheticals of the form 
“a can cause E in circumstance C," if “b “ is substituted for "a" will remain true 
and vice versa (see (1989)). 
But what determines the causal powers that a thing has? Or, in virtue of what does 
something possess the causal powers it has? Fodor's answer is that the causal powers 
of anything are determined or fixed by intrinsic physical properties (crudely, 
properties posited in theories of fundamental physics), or by those properties that 
supervene on intrinsic physical properties.49 Since the notion of determination can be 
captured by that of supervenience (see chapter 2，section 3), Fodor's claim thus can be 
put as: 
(MI): The causal powers of anything supervene on the intrinsic physical properties 
of that thing: two objects sharing all their intrinsic physical properties must also 
share all of their causal powers across all nomological contexts. 
It is easy to see that (GI), together with (MI) jointly imply that the explanatory kinds 
adopted in the sciences, whatever they are, must be individualistic, that is, they must 
As Fodor puts it "Causalpowers supervene on local microstniclure. “ ((1987): p.44). 
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be autonomous properties. 
Now since Fodor thinks that explanations provided by scientific psychology must 
involve the construction of projectible and confirming causal generalizations 
couched in terms of "mental states that are specified under intentional description: viz. 
among mental states that are picked out by reference to their content” (Fodor's 
emphasis) ((1998): p.7), it follows that if two individuals' intentional states agree in 
their causal powers, psychologists, for fear of violating (GI), must regard their states 
as belonging to the same type. Any taxonomy adopted in psychology that 
type-distinguishes intentional states that agree in their causal powers should be ruled 
out by (GI). Given (MI), it follows that psychology should concern itself only with 
autonomous properties. The above reasoning may be rather complicated, so for clarity 
we can reconstruct it as the following argument: 
Fodor，s argument for individualism from above 
1. Explanatory kinds devised by the sciences must be individuated by causal powers. 
That is, if two things agree in their causal powers, any science must regard them 
as of the same kind. 
2. The causal powers of anything are determined by or supervenient on the intrinsic 
犯 Note that Fodor's view is controversial. R. Cummins (1983), for example, argues that psychological 
explanations should be thought of as functional analysis rather than as nomological subsumption. 
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physical properties of that thing. 
3. Psychology is intended to be a scientific discipline that provides causal 
explanations by constructing causal generalizations or laws. 
4. So, explanatory kinds devised by psychology, namely intentional states, ought to 
be individuated by causal powers: if two intentional states agree in their causal 
powers，they must be counted as of the same psychological type. 
5. So, explanatory kinds devised by psychology must be autonomous properties. 
Except for premise 3, all of these premises are controversial. As a result, Fodor's 
argument is not generally accepted by philosophers. Some, for example, question the 
truth of premise 1. On the one hand, some point out that when investigating actual 
individuative practices in scientific disciplines such as evolutionary biology, 
economics, and anthropology, we find that they do not always taxonomize relevant 
entities and properties by their causal powers. And so，assuming that a plausible 
constraint on science must do justice to the actual practices of scientific disciplines, 
we should reject global individualism. On the other hand, some argue that contrary to 
what Fodor believes, (GI) is not supported on a priori grounds and so its plausibility 
is in doubt. Moreover, some argue that on some interpretations of "causal powers," 
premise 2 turns out to be false, since intrinsic physical properties are insufficient to 
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determine causal powers according to those interpretations. Worse, Wilson (1995) 
argues convincingly that there is no interpretation on which Fodor's argument is a 
sound one: either it rests on false premises, or it is invalid in that it equivocates on the 
notion of casual powers in premise 1 and 2. In the following sections I shall discuss 
these objections in turn. 
At first glance, if one is an individualist about scientific psychology and agrees 
that folk psychology taxonomizes its explanatory kinds widely, then for fear of 
inconsistency, it seems that one must reject the posits of folk psychology as 
scientifically illegitimate. Assuming that only the posits of the sciences are real, 
eliminativism then follows immediately. As we have seen, Stich cheerfully welcomes 
the eliminativist's conclusion. Though like Stich, Fodor accepts both the view that 
folk psychology is non-individualistic and that scientific psychology must be 
individualistic, he is unwilling to accept eliminativism. Indeed, he thinks that: 
If commonsense intentional psychology really were to collapse, that would be, beyond 
comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species; if we're 
wrong about the mind, then that's the wrongest we've ever been about anything. The 
collapse of the supernatural, for example, didn't compare. (1987: xii) 
One main reason why Fodor thinks eliminativism is unbearable, I think, is that if it 
were true, we could not account for the successes of folk psychology in predicting and 
explaining human behaviour without appeal to miracles. His reasoning can be 
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regarded as an instance of the so-called No Miracle argument，;】a kind of argument in 
philosophy of science often appealed to by realists. In its crudest form, the argument 
goes like this. Given that a scientific theory (e.g., Maxwell's theory of 
electromagnetic fields) has been tremendously successful in prediction and 
explanation, if miracles are to be avoided, the best way to account for its success, is to 
endorse the ontology to which the theory is committed 一 that is, to take the theoretical 
posits of the theory to refer to genuine properties and to regard is claims as 
approximately true. Folk psychology, according to Fodor, is an implicit empirical 
theory with tremendous predictive and explanatory potency. So, if eliminativism were 
true, how could the successes of folk psychology be explained without appeal to 
miracles? 
Second, Fodor does not believe that we can do psychology without the structure 
of intentional explanations, as he thinks that there are psychological generalizations 
that can only be captured or couched in terms of content. As he says, "the reliable 
explanatory generalizations of any psychology that we can now foresee will be 
intentional through and through; if there are no intentional laws, then there are no 
psychological explanations" ((1994): p.3). 
However, Fodor thinks that any adequate taxonomy of scientific psychology must 
See, e.g., (1987): ch 1. 
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respect individualism and agrees that the theoretical posits of folk psychology are not 
individualistic. So, in order to 'have it both ways' 一 to respect individualism and to 
save folk psychology - Fodor tries to revise wide intentional states in a manner that 
"renders them individualistic while preserving the basic structure of intentional 
explanation" (Stalnaker (1989); (1999): p. 170). How can he do this? Before getting 
into Fodor's own account, it would be appropriate to clarify the general character of 
revisionist project^^. 
2. A Response to Individualism: Rendering Intentional States Individualistic 
Even if our having a given (wide) intentional state (type) is in part dependent on 
something external to us, as externalists argue, no one denies that every intentional 
state has an internal component, which is wholly within the agent and partly 
determines wide intentional states. For after all, intentional states such as believing 
that water is wet, unlike the properties of being three miles away from Fung King Hey 
building and that of living in a watery world, are not pure relational properties - that 
is, not properties the possession of which is merely a matter of facts about the object's 
environment. We can dump any object on Twin Earth and thereby give it the property 
of being in a world where there is twater in lakes, but we "cannot just dump an object 
The following account of the revisionist's project is from Stalnaker ((1989)). 
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on twan-earth, and thereby bring it to believe that twin-water quenches thirst" (Joe 
Lau(1994)). 
So intentional states are hybrid relational properties, in the sense that each of them 
is composed of two elements: an internal component, a state that is internal to the 
subject, and an external component that consists of the relation holding between the 
subject and its environment. Revisionists aim to find some way to factor out the 
internal contribution to an intentional state - the internal component of the state that is 
supervenient on the subject's intrinsic physical properties. We can call this component 
"narrow content.“ 
However, at least at first sight, the notion of narrow intentional states seems to be 
incoherent. For an intentional state is generally conceived to be a relation between the 
subject and a kind of object, namely a content. For example, the statement that 
Lorraine believes that her boyfriend is smart expresses the relation between an 
individual - Lorraine - and a particular content - her boyfriend is smart. So how can 
an intentional state be both a relational property (in the above sense) and a property 
that supervenes on intrinsic physical properties? "Isn't it obvious that semantic 
properties, and intentional properties generally, are relational properties, properties 
defined in terms of relations between a speaker or agent and what he or she talks or 
thinks about? And isn't it obvious that relations depend, in all but degenerate cases, 
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on more than the intrinsic properties of one of the things related?,, (Stalnaker (1989); 
(1999): p. 170). 
The apparent incoherence disappears once we distinguish two senses in which a 
concept or property is relational Consider mass and length, two properties usually 
cited as typical examples of intrinsic properties. We regard them as intrinsic because 
we expect that any two objects physically identical must have the same mass and 
length. Let's call this sense of a property being intrinsic "ontologically intrinsic.“ 
Properties that are not ontologically intrinsic are ontological relational Weight is a 
typical example of an ontologically relational concept，in that two objects 
indiscernible with respect to autonomous properties may not share the same weight if 
placed in environments with different local gravity.^^ 
That a property is ontologically intrinsic, however, is perfectly compatible with 
saying that it is relational in another sense. To illustrate this point, let's consider again 
the physical magnitudes mass and length. Their intrinsic nature does not prevent us 
from measuring, specifying, and picking them out by things external to them, that is, 
by relational means. To say that a book has a mass of 3 Kg is to say that it bears a 
particular relation to the International Prototype Kilogram: it will balance on an 
equal-arm balance these objects each of which balances the Standard Kilogram. To 
“ N o t e that this sense of being intrinsic and relational is that I explain in chapter 2. 
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say that a stick has a length of 1 meter is to say that it has the same length with the 
Standard Meter. A relational predicate, together with a number, is usually used to 
specify and pick out the fact that an object has a property, for example "having a mass 
of 3 Kg." Let's call a property's being relational in this sense "semanticaUy 
relational. 
Now it should be clear that no incoherence lies in the notion of narrow intentional 
states. What revisionists want to work out is a kind of intentional state that is 
ontologically intrinsic but semantically relational: these states are autonomous 
properties but, like wide or ordinary intentional states, can be picked out or specified 
relationally. 
It is of the utmost importance to know that the task before the revisionists is not just 
to factor out the internal contributions to a particular wide intentional state such as 
believing that water is wet. What is required rather is to demonstrate that 
corresponding to every wide intentional property, there can be at least one narrow 
counterpart and how the narrow intentional states determine the wide ones in various 
contexts. The idea can be captured by the following abstract schema (Stalnaker (1999): 
P. 24) 
54 Accounts of the distinction between these two senses of being relational can be founded in Stalnaker 
(1989), Kim (1996): ch. 8). 
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For any agent jc, x believes that p iff ( ^Q) (x believesn g , and C (2 , that p\ where 
“believesn” expresses the relation holding between agents and narrow contents, the 
quantifier ranges over narrow contents, and the C relation relates narrow contents 
to their wide counterparts. 
What revisionists need to do is to flesh out the schema by specifying (1) what it is for 
a subject to possess a narrow belief with a particular content p, and (2) what a context 
consists in, and (3) the correlation between wide intentional states and their narrow 
counterparts: how a narrow intentional state, accompanied by context ( Q , determines 
a wide one. The revisionist's project counts as successful only when (1) to (3) are 
satisfied. Equipped with this overview of the revisionists' project in general, let's turn 
to Fodor's own version of revisionism. 
2.1 Fodor，s Account of Narrow content^^ 
Fodor' own distinctive account of narrow content is closely related to his diagnosis of 
the twin-earth thought experiment. What makes Oscar and Oscar* have different 
intentional states, according to him, is the following fact: assuming semantic 
extemalism for certain terms, the truth-conditions of utterances and tokens of 
“ N o t e that Fodor (1994) rejects his account of narrow content. 
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intentional properties such as beliefs that involve such terms are in part constituted by 
the environment in which the utterers and the believers are situated. As a result, the 
truth conditions or contents of their utterances and beliefs should be regarded as 
distinct because Oscar and his twin are embedded in different environments. To factor 
out the internal contributions or to subtract the environmental facts relevant to the 
determination of contents of utterances and thoughts - that is, to put truth conditions 
back into the head - Fodor proposes that we can construe the internal components of 
contents as functions (in the mathematical sense) that take possible contexts as 
arguments and truth conditions as values. In other words, narrow contents are 
functions that map possible contexts onto truth conditions. Since such content has no 
dealings with the environment and hence is wholly inside the believer, Fodor calls it 
"narrow content.“ 
So, to have an intentional state with a particular narrow content is to have a state 
with a particular function that enables an individual in various contexts to entertain 
various intentional states with wide content. The criterion of narrow content can thus 
be formulated as this: the narrow contents of two tokens of intentional states (and of 
utterances) are identical just in case in all possible contexts they will generate the 
same truth conditions” 
Fodor's characterization of narrow content is inspired by D. Kaplan's semantic account of 
context-dependent expressions such as demonstratives and indexicals (e.g. "This", "That", "I", "You", 
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Perhaps the idea can be made clearer by an example. The narrow content shared 
by Oscar and his twin when each of them says and believes that water is a boring 
drink is the function that when anchored on earth generates the truth condition that 
water (H20) is wet, and when embedded in twin-earth yields the truth condition that 
twater (XYZ) is wet. 
2.2 Criticisms of Fodor�s account of narrow content 
As I have said, any adequate account of narrow content must satisfy conditions (1) to 
(3) in the abstract schema. So now we need to see whether Fodor provides us with an 
informative guide to how to individuate contexts. The following is his account of 
what a context is: 
Til ere is presumably something about the relation between Twin-Earth and Twin-me in 
virtue of which his 'water'- thought are about XYZ even though my water-thoughts are not. 
Call this condition that's satisfied by {Twin-Me, Twin-Earth) condition C (because it 
determines the Context of his ‘water'-thoughts). Similarly, there must be something about 
the relation between me and Earth in virtue of which my water-thoughts are about H20 
even though my Twin's 'water' - thoughts are not. Call this condition that is satisfied by 
{me，Earth} condition C ((1987): p.48). 
We may agree with Fodor that there is something about the relation between the 
believer and her environment such that in virtue of standing in such a relation that her 
belief with a particular narrow content generates a belief with the corresponding wide 
"Here", "There"). According to Kaplan, context-dependent terms have characters or linguistic 
meanings (e.g. the character of "I" is the utterer of the utterance), which yield truth conditions of 
utterances in particular context but are constant over different contexts of utterances. 
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content or truth condition. One can hardly deny this if he thinks that intentional states 
are hybrid relational properties. But what does this relation consist in? 
Fodor proposes that a particular context should include anything relevant to the 
determination of wide content. But such a specification is uninformative, since 
context, ex, hypothesis, is something external to the individual that is relevant to 
determining beliefs with wide content. And surely it is true that context so construed, 
together with narrow content construed as the internal contribution to wide content, 
can determine a particular wide content. But this assertion just amounts to restating 
the point that intentional states are hybrid relational properties.^'' It still remains 
unclear what is involved when an individual with a narrow content is embedded in a 
particular context. 
The triviality of Fodor's characterization of context can be made more prominent 
by comparing it with the concept of weight. Physicists tell us that weight is a hybrid 
relational concept, since for any object to have a particular weight, other than 
instantiating a certain intrinsic property — having a particular mass - it must be 
embedded in a certain context, a particular local gravitational field - which serves as 
the external component that contributes to the object's having that weight. To have a 
particular mass is to instantiate a particular function that when embedded in different 
57 This objection is inspired by Stalnaker's (1989); (1999): pp. 176-77). 
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local gravitational fields will determine a corresponding weight. In the case of weight, 
physicists have provided us with a concrete procedure about how the relevant 
contexts - gravitational fields - are to be individuated. We are not just told that the 
external component of having a particular weight is just anything external to the 
object and relevant to the determination of having that weight. 
Moreover, Fodor claims that the narrow content of Oscar's and Oscar*，s belief 
that water is wet is the same. As a result, were Oscar transported to twin earth, the 
truth condition of his belief would immediately shift to be twater (XYZ) is wet (and 
the truth conditions of all of his intentional states expressed by using "water" would 
also shift analogusly). Likewise，were he transported to the earth, the wide content of 
Oscar*'s belief expressed by the same type of utterance as Oscar would at once shift 
to be water (H2O) is wet. In short, Fodor's account entails that whenever the contexts 
of the narrow contents of belief tokens and utterances involving natural kinds are 
changed, the wide contents of the beliefs will thereby be changed.^^ This, however, 
seems at odds with the standard interpretation of twin-earth story. For it is generally 
agreed that were Oscar transported to twin-earth, his beliefs expressed in terms of 
"water" would still be thoughts about water (H2O). Similarly, Oscar*'s contents of 
utterances and beliefs would still remain unchanged even if he were transported to the 
This objection (though not the same as) is closely related to the one that denies changes in an 
individual's environment will cause changes in the causal powers of her intentional states. For more 
detailed discussions of the latter view, see Davies (1986) and Cain ((2002): p. 163) 
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earth: when he believes that water is a boring drink on earth, what he believes is the 
same as what he believes on Twin Earth - that XYZ is a boring drink. In other words, 
the wide contents of such thoughts will not be affected by his environment 
immediately.^'^ 
There are other serious objections to Fodor's account of narrow content. 
Stalnaker in fact argues that any attempt to complete the above schema will face a 
great deal of obstacles ((1990), (1993)). 
Fodor needs to provide a theory of narrow content to save folk psychology 
because he holds that individualism in psychology is a plausible constraint. But is it? 
In the following sections I shall argue that Fodor's argument cannot be sound. I begin 
with his argument for global individualism. 
3. Examining Global Individualism 一 Fodor ’s A Priori Argument 
As I said in section 1, Fodor believes that global individualism can be merely derived 
from the fact that science aims at providing causal explanations for phenomena and 
that causal explanations involve subsuming the things to be explained under causal 
generalizations, or, equivalently, ascribing causal properties to the explananda. Since 
外 However, since the standard interpretation also claims that were Oscar lived in twin earth for a 
considerable period of time, since he has interacted with a lot of twater (XYZ), his thoughts expressed 
in terms of "water" would gradually become twater-thoughts. So, Fodor's account thus can do justice 
to the standard interpretation if we take account of temporal considerations. 
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the explanatia of causal explanations or the antecedents of causal generalizations must 
be taxonomized in accordance with causal similarities and differences, Fodor 
concludes that they must be those individuated by their causal powers. 
The main flaw in this argument is that the conclusion does not follow from the 
premises. For it is one thing to require that a classification scheme for causal 
properties assign distinct token phenomena (events, individuals, and whatever) to the 
same type just in case they agree in relevant causal similarities. But it is surely quite 
another thing to require that it must do so just in case they agree in causal powers. 
Grouping token phenomena under the same type in virtue of causal similarities may 
involve certain environmental and historical properties of those phenomena rather 
than what effects that those phenomena can bring about. That is to say, individuating 
causal properties by causal similarities permits them to be individuated perfectly well 
in a way that is essentially backward looking - what determines whether or not an 
object belongs to a category is what, it is caused by rather than what it can cause. As 
Wilson puts this point: 
The relevant causal similarities between two phenomena in a given discipline may involve 
the causes of those phenomena or the causal relations they stands in, rather than what those 
phenomena are capable of causing. The historical and relational properties that two entities 
share may well explain why those entities share many other properties, and there is no 
reason to regard explanations citing such properties as non-causal (Wilson's emphasis) 
((1995): p.33). 
One such example is the property of being a victim of 9-11 incident. Whether a 
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person belongs to this category essentially hinges on her history or even her parent's 
history rather than what she can do or cause. This property can help explain many 
other properties of its instances. To explain why an individual's body was injured, it 
may be informative to cite the fact that she was a victim of the 9-11 incident. And it 
seems that explanations that make use of this property as explanans are not 'less 
causal'. In the next section I shall give some examples to show that in addition to 
examples from ordinary life, explanantia of causal explanations individuated by their 
causes are widespread in scientific disciplines, including natural and social sciences. 
3.1 Counterexamples to Global Individualism 
It seems reasonable to suppose that a normative constraint on science is plausible if it 
is countenanced on both a priori and a posteriori grounds - that is, if it can be derived 
from certain metaphysical assumptions and if it conforms to actual scientific practices. 
The previous section showed that the demand that causal properties be taxonomized 
by causal similarities does not imply that they must be taxonomized by causal powers. 
This shows that, contrary to what Fodor thinks, (GI), as a general constraint on 
taxonomizing explanantia of causal explanations, does not follow merely from a 
priori grounds - from the uncontroversial claim that explanantia of causal 
explanations must be individuated by causal similarities. This provides us with a 
7 6 
reason for doubting (GI). 
Can (GI) be defended on a posteriori grounds? That is, do actual individuative 
practices in scientific disciplines conform to (GI)? Are causal properties always 
taxonomized by causal powers? 
No doubt some scientific disciplines classify explanantia on the basis of their causal 
powers. Being soluble in water, a property figuring in certain causal generalizations in 
chemistry, for instance, is one such example, since what an object can do or cause 
constitutes the individuative criteria that determines whether or not it is soluble - to 
be so, the object must dissolve when immersed in water. Another example is the 
property of having a mass of 1 Kg. To specify the individuation-condition for it is to 
specify what an object can cause by virtue of it in various different contexts. For 
instance, in virtue of possessing a mass of 1 Kg, an object will accelerate with a 
certain value and will have a certain kinetic energy in certain circumstances. 
As many philosophers have pointed out (e.g., Burge (1986), (1989); Egan (1991), 
Wilson (1995)), close examination of actual explanatory practices in a variety of 
sciences indicates that they do not solely or even primarily classify causal properties 
by their causal powers, relational taxonomy - that is, individuating antecedents of 
causal generalizations in a backward-looking way - is widespread in scientific 
disciplines such as biology, economics, linguistics, biology, and astronomy. 
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Consider the concept^® of species, a central explanatory kind in evolutionary 
biology. Many biological generalizations are defined over it. Cope's law, for 
example, asserts that unspecialized species tend to avoid extinction longer than 
specialized species. According to the traditional understanding of species, a particular 
species such as Cards familiar is or Drosophilia melanogaster is defined by its 
morphological or genetic properties. The former of these views holds that what 
determines whether an organism belongs to a particular species is essentially 
determined or fixed by a set of observable features - determinate forms of phenotypes. 
For a long time, "[t]he search for similarities and differences in phenotypic traits [was] 
at the heart of most classification of taxa in biology" (Caplan (1980)). The systematic 
procedures that decide whether a given domestic dog falls under the species Canis 
familaris, for example, are based on whether it possesses certain phenotypic traits 
such as having four legs, a tail, upper and lower teeth, and so on. The latter of these 
views, by contrast, holds that the essence of a particular species is determined not by 
its phenotypic properties but by its genetic properties, for example, having particular 
sequences o fDNA in the genome，^ 
For a period of time, these two views dominated the taxonomy of species. 
6° Some philosophers distinguish concepts from properties, but here I take them to be the same. 
61 That the concept of species is relationally taxonomized is pointed out by Egan (1991) and Wilson 
(1995). 
62 In the current literature on philosophy of biology, these views on the taxonomy of species are called 
essentialism on species. For a detailed discussion of this view, see Ruse (1998) and Wilson (1999). 
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Nevertheless，nowadays most biologists agree that it is inappropriate to define species 
solely in terms of morphological or genetic properties. An appropriate definition of 
species, they propose, should involve not only the physical constitution of an 
organism but also its causal ancestry. Whether a group of organisms are regarded as 
belonging to the same species, according to these biologists, is determined not only by 
whether they possess certain morphological or genetic properties but also by whether 
they are descended from a common ancestor. Mayr, for instance, defines species as “ a 
reproductive community of populations (reproductively isolated from others) that 
occupies a specific niche in nature" ((1982): p.273). A consequence of this view is 
that two organisms may have the same physical constitution - namely the same 
morphological and genetic properties - but do not count as belonging to the same 
species. Even if biologists find a dog sharing all of the morphological and genetic 
properties of my dog Billy, if the two do not share a common evolutionary ancestry, 
the biologists will not count them as of the same species. So species is a hybrid 
relational concept, since it is individuated not only by causal powers but also by 
historical properties of organisms. 
Consider the concept of being a planet. It is an explanatory kind in astronomy, a 
discipline, like evolutionary biology, the scientific status of which should be 
unquestioned. Like the concept of species, being a planet is a hybrid relational 
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concept. For whatever counts as a planet not only needs to possess a certain physical 
constitution but also needs to bear a certain relationship to things external to it, 
specifically a star that it orbits. The earth is a planet because it orbits the sun. An 
object that does not orbit a star will not be regarded as a planet even if it is a physical 
duplicate of the earth. 
The identity conditions of these two concepts are in part determined by things 
external to them. In some scientific disciplines, the central explanatory kinds are even 
wholly determined by external conditions. Take the concept of money, a central 
concept in economics, as an example. Many causal generalizations refer to this 
concept. Gresham's law, for example, holds that bad money drives good money out of 
circulation. Money, whether good or bad, however, is not individuated by its physical 
constitution but by its causal ancestry, namely being issued by the government. In 
brief, money is a pure relational concept. 
As the above examples show, many entities and properties in the sciences are 
taxonomized relationally, so if we agree that a plausible constraint on science must 
conform to actual scientific practice, then we should conclude that (GI) is false. 
Consequently, Fodor's argument for individualism is unsound. 
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3.2 Can Global Individualism be reconciled with the Relational Taxonomies? 
Fodor, however, believes that global individualism can do justice to the prevalence of 
relational taxonomies in sciences. He writes: 
It is patent that taxonomic categories in science are often relational. Just as you'd expect, 
relational properties can count taxonomically whenever they affect causal powers. Thus, 
'being a planet' is a relational property par excellence, but it's one that individualism 
permits to operate in astronomical taxonomy (My emphasis) (Fodor (1987): p. 43)). 
As the above passage suggests, Fodor does not think that any relational property must 
be ruled out by individualism. Being a planet, as I have pointed out, is plainly a 
relational property, since for anything to be a planet, it must stand in a certain relation 
to its environment, namely orbiting a star. Nonetheless, this property, according to 
Fodor, is one meeting the demands of individualism. For being a planet affects the 
causal powers ofwhatever instantiates it So Fodor seems to think that individualism 
should be more liberally construed: it should permit explanatory kinds to be 
individuated not only by narrow causal powers, but also by what affects narrow 
causal powers. 
But what exactly does it mean to say that being a planet (causally) affects its 
instances' (narrow) causal powers? Unfortunately, Fodor (1987) provides no exp ici 
characterization of this notion. But I suggest Fodor would say something like the 
following. Whatever instantiates the relational property of being a planet must stand 
in a particular relation to a particular object (a star). And though this enviro誰ental 
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fact does not constitute the narrow correlate of the planet - its physical 
compositions — its presence in a sense plays a causal role in determining what an 
object does at a particular time. Or，to put it in another way，the relation that a planet 
stands in is in a sense causally relevant to its narrow behaviour. "Whether you are a 
planet affects your trajectory, and your trajectory determines what you can bump into" 
((1987): P.43)，as Fodor puts it. It is in this sense that a planet is causally affected by 
its being a planet and hence being a planet is a property permitted by global 
individualism. 
Of course, not all relational properties affect their instances. Recall the H-T particle 
case discussed in chapter 2. Call a particle an "H-particle at time t” iff a particular 
dime of Fodor's is heads up and a particle a "T-particle at time t" iff the dime is tails 
up. So Fodor can change every particle in the universe from an H-particle to 
T-particle and back again by turning over his dime. According to Fodor, since 
"whether something is an H-(T-) particle is irrelevant to its causal powers" ((1987): 
p.33)，in the sense that the presence of the external fact (the orientation of Fodor's 
dime) that figure in the individuation conditions of these two properties makes no 
causal difference to what these particles do, the relational kind H-(T) particles should 
be ruled out by individualism. 
The above discussion suggests that we can reformulate global individualism 
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(premise 1) as follows: 
(1*) Any explanatory categories or kinds devised by the sciences K must be: 
(a) individuated by narrow causal powers or (b) individuated by what affects narrow 
causal powers: the presence of the external conditions of K is in a sense causally 
relevant to its instances ’ narrow behaviours^^. 
3.3 Two Senses of Causal Relevance of External Conditions 
Fodor believes that so construed, (1*) (call it liberal global individualism) can do 
justice to the fact that in some scientific disciplines, causal properties are relationally 
taxonomized. But what exactly does Fodor mean by "causal relevance,，？ Again, Fodor 
provides no explicit answer to this question. Nonetheless, to help answer it, we may 
distinguish between two senses in which the external condition(s) of a relational kind 
R is (are) causally relevant to its instances' narrow behaviour.64 
(CRl): For any relational property R, its external condition(s), E, is (are) causally 
63 Stich, in characterizing his principle of autonomy, also seems to use "individualism" in this liberal 
sense, as after saying that "the basic idea of the principle is that Ihe slates and processes that ought 1o 
be of concern to the psychologisi are those supervene on the current, internal physical state of the 
organism, “ he adds that "historical and eiiviroumenlal facts will be psychologically relevant only when 
they influence an organism 's current, internal, physical stales" ((1983): pp. 164-5). 
64 This distinction between two senses of causal relevance is inspired by the one drawn by R. Stalnaker 
(1989; 1999: (pp. 190-1)). 
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relevant I to the narrow behaviour of its instances: there cannot be external 
conditions (e.g., environmental facts) other than E that can cause R!!? instances to 
behave as they actually do. 
(CR2): For any relational property R, its external condition(s), E, is (are) causally 
relevant! to the narrow behaviours of its instances: were E not present, Ri-
instances would not behave as they actually do. 
As is shown by the different arguments for externalism, the narrow counterpart of 
a given intentional property can have various causal ancestries. For example, in the 
twin earth story I discussed in chapter 2, even if Oscar and his replica Oscar* have the 
same neurophysiological state that causes them to behave in a certain way，their 
causal ancestries are different (Oscar's is caused by the fact that there is water (H20) 
in his environment, Oscar*，s by the fact that there is twater (XYZ) in his 
environment). In the case of my seeing Lorraine, the narrow counterpart of the 
thought that the girl standing there is Lorraine, the internal state that disposes me to 
exhibit certain behaviours, such as the utterance "Hi, Lorraine," surely could be 
produced by external conditions other than Lorraine herself - for example, by her 
hologram. So the external conditions of intentional properties are not causally 
8 4 
relevanti to the narrow behaviour of their instances. 
Is this sense of "causal relevance" the one Fodor intends? The answer seems to be 
No. For as Stalnaker ((1989)) points out, like external conditions that figure in the 
identity conditions of folk psychological intentional states, orbiting a star is not 
causally relevant to the planet's behaviour in this sense, since it is easy to conceive a 
possible world in which there is a large chunk of matter, which is a physical duplicate 
of a planet, yet instead of oribiting the sun, is in a field of force exactly like the one 
that the earth actually is in. So, if causal relevance is interpreted in this sense, 
individualism will rule out being a planet as a proper scientific kind and thus cannot 
be true of actual taxonomic practices in the sciences. This means that premise (1 is 
false and hence the argument still turns out. to be unsound. 
It seems to me that the sense of "causal relevance" that Fodor has in mind is the 
second one. A planet's behaving in a certain way at a particular time - say, having a 
particular velocity - is determined not only by its intrinsic features but also by the 
environment it is in. As a result, had the earth's environment been changed, then, of 
course, the earth would have behaved in a different way. The following counterfactual 
seems to be true: Had the earth not been in an environment in which there is a star 
near it, then it would not have behaved as it actually does. And it is in this sense that 
the external conditions of the property of being a planet are causally relevant to the 
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narrow behaviour of its instances. 
As Fodor H-T particle case illustrates, not all external conditions of relational 
properties are causally relevant2 to their instances' behaviour. The orientation of 
Fodor's dime (H or T) is in no sense causally relevant to the particles' behaviour. 
Being in an environment in which the orientation of Fodor's dime is H or T does not 
determine how particles behave. The following counterfactuals seem to be false: (1) 
"Had the orientation of Fodor's dime not been heads up, then the particles would not 
have behaved as they actually did." (2) "Had the orientation of Fodor's dime not been 
tails up, then the particles would not have behaved as they actually did." 
Certain external conditions of a relational property are causally relevant! to its 
instances' behaviour, according to Fodor, just in case there are causal laws that 
correlate the external conditions and the instances of the relational property in 
question. As Fodor put it "where there are no causal laws about a property, having the 
property - or failing to have it - has no effect on causal powers" ((1987): p. 43). In 
the case of the property of being a planet, such causal laws are not difficult to find. 
What accounts for the fact that being in an environment in which there is a star is 
causally relevant to a planet's behaviour is Newton's law of universal gravitation. It is 
in virtue of a planet's being in that environment that the star, qua a massive object, 
exerts a gravitational force on it and thereby the planet behaves in a certain way. By 
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contrast, in the case of being an H/T particle, no causal law correlating particles' 
behaviour with the orientation of Fodor's dime can be found. 
With the notion of causal relevance!, we now can flesh out global individualism as 
follows: 
(1*) Any explanatory categories or kinds K devised by the sciences must be: 
(a) individuated by narrow causal powers or (b) individuated by what affects narrow 
causal powers: Had the external conditions of K (E) not been present, K's instances 
would not have behaved as they actually do. Or, equivalently, there are causal laws 
that correlate the external conditions of K with the behavior of its instances. 
It is obvious that (1*) so modified, together with premises 2 and 3, suggests that we 
need to refine individualism in psychology (5) as follows: 
(5*) Explanatory kinds devised by psychology must either be (a) autonomous 
properties or be (b) a kind of relational property, the external conditions of which are 
causally relevant 2 to its instances' narrow behaviour. 
It appears that Fodor believes that (5*) will still rule out the intentional properties of 
folk psychology as proper candidates for scientific psychology. As he says: 
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the property of being a planet is taxonomic because there are causal laws that things satisfy 
in virtue of being planets. By contrast, the property of living in a world in which there is 
XYZ in the puddles is not taxonomic because there are no causal laws that things satisfy in 
virtue of having that property. And similarly for the property of living in a speech 
community in which people use 'brisket' to refer to brisket of beef (Fodor's emphasis) 
((1987): p. 43). 
Is Fodor right on this point? Some think not, since wide intentional properties do 
causally affect the narrow causal powers of their instances 一 that is，the external 
conditions of intentional properties and their instances are related in such a way that 
the former is causally relevant! to the latter, (see, e.g，. Stalnaker (1989); (1999): p.l88, 
Wilson (1995): p.48)). To illustrate, consider the belief (type) that water is a boring 
drink. The external condition that figures in this bel iefs individuation condition (that 
of living in a world in which there is H2O) surely is causally relevant! to the narrow 
or autonomous behaviour of whoever instantiates that belief type. This can be shown 
by running the following counterfactual test: Had Oscar not been placed in an 
environment in which there is water, then he would not have the neruophysiological 
state that serves as the narrow counterpart of that belief type and had he not had this 
state, he would not have behaved as he actually does. Likewise, had I not been in an 
environment in which the girl in front of me is Lorraine, I would not have the internal 
state that disposes me to instantiate certain autonomous behaviour such as waving my 
hand and producing the utterance "Hi Lorraine. ’’ 
As we saw in section 2, Fodor thinks that the project of revising wide intentional 
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states is pressing only because Fodor thinks that individualism in psychology conflicts 
with folk psychology. However, if (GI) is liberally construed�individualism in 
psychology is perfectly compatible with wide intentional states. As a result, Fodor's 
account of narrow content is pointless. 
Moreover, even if liberal (GI) can do justice to explanatory kinds that are hybrid 
relational properties, it is not clear how it is compatible with the fact that the 
explanatory kinds of many scientific disciplines are pure relational properties. The 
concept of money, for example, is not individuated by narrow causal powers at all. 
Nor is it individuated by what affects causal powers. 
3.4 Conclusion: The failure of the Explanan Argument 
One way to make (GI) conform to the relational taxonomies commonly used in the 
sciences is to enlarge the notion of causal powers in premise If we take certain 
environmental and historical properties as constituents or components of causal 
powers, then surely (GI) is consistent with the prevalence of relational taxonomies. 
Suppose，for example, that we regard the evolutionary history of a particular species 
as one constituent of its causal powers. Then it is true that the concept of species can 
be described as being individuated by causal powers. For two organisms will be 
“ S e e Wilson (1995): pp.45-6. 
8 9 
classified as the same species if they share the same morphological and genetic 
properties and evolutionary history. However, if the notion of causal powers is 
interpreted in this way, Fodor's argument is still unsound. For causal powers so 
construed will not be determined by or supervenient on intrinsic physical properties: 
two individuals sharing all the same intrinsic physical properties will not necessarily 
agree in their causal powers in this sense, for an individual's intrinsic physical 
properties are insufficient to fix its environmental and historical properties. This 
means that premise 2 is false and Fodor's argument turns out to be unsound. As a 
result, individualism cannot be deduced from the argument. 
So it seems that the only way to make both (1) and (2) true, as Wilson (1995: ch 2) 
points out, is to equivocate on the meaning of "causal powers": "Causal powers" in (1) 
is understood as narrow causal powers, but in (2) as wide causal powers or causal 
properties. This equivocation of course means Fodor's argument is invalid. To sum 
up, Fodor，s argument either contains false premises or is invalid. 
9 0 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
I t � i s generally agreed that the theoretical posits of folk psychology - intentional 
properties - are individuated by their prepositional contents. According to extemalism, 
this ordinaiy, intuitive notion of content is wide, in the sense that it is not supervenient 
on the intrinsic physical properties of individuals. The conjunction of these two 
claims - that intentional properties are individuated by prepositional contents, which 
are wide - entails that folk psychology itself is non-individualistic. 
The wideness of folk psychological contents apparently clashes with 
individualism, the doctrine that explanatory kinds in scientific psychology must be 
individualistic. As a result, if individualism can be shown to be a plausible constraint 
on scientific psychology, then folk psychology cannot be a legitimate part of scientific 
psychology. This, together with the claim that only the theoretical posits of the 
sciences are real, provides one route to eliminativism. 
In this thesis I have been concerned mainly with the question of whether 
individualism is a plausible constraint on scientific psychology. But as I noted in the 
Introduction, all the premises of the above argument are controversial. For example, 
though the view that intentional states as folk psychology conceives them are wide is 
shared by many individualists and anti-individualists, it is by no means a generally 
accepted view. Some philosophers, for example，reject the semantic intuitions about 
9 1 
the twin earth thought experiments by arguing that contrary to semantic extemalism, 
meanings are in the head.^^ Moreover in this thesis, following many philosophers, I 
have characterized folk psychology as an empirical theory containing a cluster of 
causal generalizations couched in terms of intentional states. This view has in fact 
been challenged by many philosophers and psychologists. According to simulation 
theory, our ability to explain and predict human behaviour by using intentional idioms 
is not due to our employing a theory. Rather, what enables us to do this is that we use 
our own decision-making systems to simulate the psychological mechanisms of 
others.67 If this view turns out to be true, then it seems that the eliminativist argument 
cannot get off the ground, since folk psychology is not a theoiy after all. 
I approach the question of whether scientific psychology should be individualistic 
by examining two distinct types of arguments. One argues for individualism from a 
normative claim about how the explananda of psychology should be individuated (the 
argument from below); the other derives individualism from a claim about how the 
explanantia of psychology should be typed (the argument from above). As I have 
shown, these two normative doctrines can be derived from two general constraints on 
scientific taxonomy. There are metaphysical individualism, the view that the causal 
powers of anything are determined by that thing's intrinsic physical properties, and 
66 See, e.g., Searle (1983). 
67 Defenders of this view include Gordon (1986) and Heil (1986). 
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global individualism, the view that explanatory kinds or categories in the sciences are 
individuated by their causal powers. In chapter 3,1 argue that contrary to what Fodor 
believes, violating metaphysical individualism does not make a mystery of mental 
causation, once we recognize that there are two kinds of causal powers. And in 
chapter 4, I argue that global individualism is not supported by actual individuative 
practices in sciences, nor can it be derived from a metaphysical doctrine concerning 
the nature of causal explanations. All these provide us with reasons for rejecting 
eliminativism. 
One should note that other than arguments that derive individualism from certain 
metaphysical and methodological doctrines, there are arguments that derive it from 
the considerations about the theoretical commitments and explanatory practices of a 
given branch of scientific psychology.^^ Burge's (1986) argument for individualism 
can be seen as of this type. The arguments that I have discussed - the aim of 
psychology argument and the explanan argument - are of the former kind. I remain 
wholly silent on the latter arguments, and I admit that a complete answer to the 
question of whether or not scientific psychology should be individualistic cannot be 
settled merely by considering metaphysical principles. To evaluate the plausibility of 
individualism in psychology more comprehensively, one needs to examine the 
Classifying arguments for individualism in this way can be found in Egan (1993) and Cain (2002). 
9 3 
theoretical commitments of different branches of psychology. It may turn out that 
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